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Abstract
Motivated by the recent experience of  Greece and other relatively small European Mon-
etary Union members, this paper examines the appeal of  taking part in a large monetary 
union from the perspective of  small open economies. We show that in the absence of  
fiscal policy considerations, taking part in a large monetary union is counterproductive 
for a small economy. Nevertheless, once the role of  fiscal policy is properly incorpo-
rated, taking part in the monetary union becomes desirable from a social perspective. 
Following these results, we explore the prospects of  engaging both economies in fiscal 
coordination and on how different schemes of  policy synchronization can provide the 
grounds to make cooperation beneficial for the members of  a monetary union. We find 
that when monetary and fiscal authorities cooperate and attempt to exploit externali-
ties for their own benefit, a Pareto efficient outcome can be achieved if  fiscal policy 
in the monetary union is coordinated by a central authority and such authority acts as a 
the Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis the central bank. Our analysis suggests that this regime 
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is superior to (i) a monetary union in which fiscal authorities conduct their policy in an 
independent or (ii) coordinated fashion, (iii) a regime where both authorities internalize 
the effects of  their own externalities by allowing the central bank to act as Stackelberg 
leader and (iv) a regime in which the small open economy decides to stay out of  the 
monetary union.
Key words: common central bank, policy coordination, monetary union, monetary 
leadership, fiscal leadership. 
JEL Classification: E52, E58, E61, F15.
Resumen
Motivado por la experiencia reciente de Grecia y otros relativamente pequeños miem-
bros de la Unión Monetaria Europea, este trabajo examina la decisión de tomar parte 
en una gran unión monetaria desde la perspectiva de las economías pequeñas y abiertas. 
Se demuestra que, en ausencia de consideraciones de política fiscal, el tomar parte en 
una gran unión monetaria es contraproducente para una economía pequeña. Sin em-
bargo, una vez que el papel de la política fiscal se incorpora adecuadamente, tomar 
parte en la unión monetaria se vuelve deseable desde una perspectiva social. A raíz de 
estos resultados, se exploran diferentes esquemas de coordinación de la política fiscal 
y monetaria para mostrar cómo la cooperación puede beneficiar a los miembros de 
una unión monetaria. Encontramos que cuando las autoridades monetarias y fiscales 
cooperan e intentan explotar las externalidades para su propio beneficio, un resultado 
Pareto eficiente se puede lograr si la política fiscal en la unión monetaria es coordinada 
por una autoridad central y dicha autoridad actúa como líder à la Stackelberg frente al 
banco central. Nuestro análisis sugiere que este régimen es superior a (i) una unión mo-
netaria en la que las autoridades fiscales llevan a cabo su política de forma independiente 
o (ii) de manera coordinada, (iii) un régimen en el que las dos autoridades internalizan 
los efectos de sus propias externalidades al permitir que el Banco Central actué como 
líder à la Stackelberg y (iv) un régimen en el que la pequeña economía abierta decide 
quedarse fuera de la unión monetaria.
Palabras clave: banco central común, coordinación de políticas, unión monetaria, 
liderazgo monetario, liderazgo fiscal.
IћѡџќёѢѐѡіќћ 
Since the European Monetary Union (EMU) was implemented, its members 
benefited from higher price stability and output growth, exchange rate volatility 
removal, lower interest rates and reduced country risk. Nevertheless, joining 
EMU also entails some costs. By entering the EMU, member states automatically 
surrendered their monetary policy instruments to the European Central Bank 
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(ECB) and were automatically constrained by the fiscal rules imposed by the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).1
The recent financial crisis has shown that even a monetary union, the hard-
est form of  pegged exchange rate regimes, might be ineffective to isolate an 
economy in the presence of  large economic shocks. This is especially the case 
when, as in the EMU, countries possess different macroeconomic fundamentals 
and experience diverse economic developments. In this environment, fiscal 
policy is insufficient to respond to asymmetric shocks, since fiscal imbalances 
compromise the ability of  policymakers to deal with macroeconomic instability 
and could even feedback into the financial system. 
Indeed, according to Moro (2014), although the recent financial crisis in the 
Euro area is often described as a sovereign debt crisis, in reality it is a sequence 
of  interactions between sovereign problems and financial system problems. He 
suggests that, as public finances deteriorate, sovereign risk increases and ends up 
weakening banks’ balance sheets. Also Tagkalakis (2013) points out how unsound 
fiscal policies, by impacting negatively on market confidence, could represent 
a risk to economic and financial stability. Hence, financial instability can have 
significant implications on public finances either directly or through its effects 
on economic activity. Clearly, there is an important interlink age between fiscal 
policy and financial markets.
 In a monetary union where monetary policy is carried out by a single central 
bank but fiscal policy is the choice of  individual members, fiscal instruments 
like government expenditure and the budget deficit can be chosen in a way that 
provides imminent welfare gains for one member at the expense of  the others. 
Therefore, the presence of  externalities and free-riding incentives might yield 
inefficient outcomes in the absence of  fiscal policy coordination (Ferré, 2008). 
The existence of  this sort of  spillovers justifies the case for further policy coordi-
nation not just of  the monetary authorities but also of  the fiscal authorities.
 Two strands of  literature have addressed the impact of  fiscal and monetary 
policy coordination on the stabilization policies of  a monetary union. The first 
assumes identical economic structures in modeling macroeconomic policymak-
1  Providing that the SGP requires member states to aim for public budget balances which are close to 
equilibrium or in surplus in the medium term, the allocation of  taxes and public expenditure would 
remain the only instruments in the control of  EMU members to stabilize their economies against real 
shocks.
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ing and the second, implicitly or explicitly, uses asymmetric structure features. 
In the first strand of  literature, Evers (2015) has recently employed a dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium model with two regions to quantitatively assess 
two different designs of  fiscal federalism in a monetary union: fiscal equalization 
with nominal tax revenue sharing and a common central fiscal authority. Using 
a fully decentralized regional fiscal authority as a benchmark, he observes that 
while a central fiscal authority stabilizes regional consumption and increases 
interregional consumption risk sharing, fiscal equalization somewhat destabilizes 
regional consumption and income, while lowering the scope of  interregional 
risk sharing. 
Meanwhile, Ferré (2008) uses a simple one-period, two-goods and two-coun-
try model to define a game in which the fiscal authorities choose whether to 
coordinate under a broad or a narrow agenda. Narrow coordination is limited 
to monitoring national economic policies of  the union members and chal-
lenging practices that could harm price stability, but leaves freedom to choose 
policy objectives and instruments. In contrast, broad fiscal coordination implies 
agreement on common policy objectives. He shows that, even though a broad 
type of  coordination is preferred, there will be incentives for fiscal authorities 
to deviate.2
Literature using implicit or explicit asymmetric structures is less abundant. 
Levine and Pearlman (2001) analyze the conduct of  fiscal and monetary policy 
in a multi-country setup where all the economies have identical economic struc-
tures. A group of  “ins” forms a monetary union and a group of  “outs” retain 
monetary sovereignty. Consistent with Martin (1995), they find that, there are 
significant incentives for countries to decide individually not to join EMU and 
free-ride from the benefits that staying out of  the monetary union provides. 
In their analysis, asymmetric features implicitly arise when fiscal authorities 
pertaining to a monetary union form coalitions to cooperate on stabilization. 
They find that, joining can be convenient only if  the “ins” conduct their own 
fiscal policy in a coordinated fashion; when this happens a large monetary union 
becomes feasible. Engwerda, Aarle, and Plasmans (2002) introduce asymmetric 
features in a more explicit form. They employ a two-country dynamic model 
2  For other less recent papers employing symmetric models to assess monetary and fiscal policy coordi-
nation see, for instance, Cooper and Kempf  (2004), Dixit and Lambertini (2003; 2001), and Beetsma, 
Debrun, and Klaassen (2001), among others.
 Is fiscal policy coordination desirable for a monetary union?        7
with asymmetries in the authorities’ preferences, some of  the model structural 
parameters and on the bargaining power of  the policymakers in collective deci-
sions. They find that cooperation is often efficient for fiscal players but results 
in considerable losses for the central monetary authority. In the absence of  
asymmetries, fiscal players’ cooperation leads in most of  their simulations to a 
Pareto improvement for them but not for the central monetary authority.3 
In this paper we explore the benefits of  monetary and fiscal policy coor-
dination from the perspective of  a small economy employing a two-country 
model of  policy coordination. We think that the difference between the sizes of  
the EMU members is an important aspect that may have profound effects on the 
stabilization of  these economies. Hence, this paper focuses on the presence of  
size asymmetries and the role of  fiscal policy in macroeconomic stabilization 
to shed some light on two particular questions. First, we ask if  participating in 
a monetary union is desirable for small open economies. The second question 
is whether fiscal coordination is beneficial or counterproductive for those small 
open economies that surrender their monetary policy to a central authority. 
We find that, leaving fiscal policy considerations aside, it is straightforward 
to conclude that participation in a monetary union is counterproductive for 
a small economy. The key point to this result is that a small open economy is 
better off  “free riding”, and using its own monetary policy to counteract the 
inflationary pressures produced by supply shocks. Following this result, we 
expand the analysis to consider the interactions between fiscal and monetary 
authorities on macroeconomic stabilization. We then observe that, once rep-
resentative fiscal policymakers have been incorporated into the model, taking 
part in the monetary union becomes desirable from a social welfare perspective. 
The reason for this is that, by taking part in stabilization, fiscal authorities con-
cerned about employment respond to shocks by reducing taxes and spending, 
thus offsetting inflationary pressures and ameliorating unemployment. In ad-
dition, under a monetary union regime, the absence of  exchange rate volatility 
and the reduction in taxation are both factors that contribute to decreasing the 
losses that society experiences in the face of  the shock. Finally, the evaluation 
of  three alternative forms of  monetary and fiscal policy coordination shows 
3  See Cabral (2010), Eichengreen and Ghironi (2002), Giavazzi and Giovanini (1998), and Ghironi and 
Giavazzi (1998) for other papers that employ asymmetric features in modeling monetary and fiscal 
policy coordination.
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that the pure coordination of  fiscal authorities (playing Nash against the central 
monetary authority) results in a counterproductive strategy for both economies. 
On harmonizing the interaction between fiscal and monetary authorities, a mon-
etary leadership strategy results in a deterioration of  the position of  the small 
economy’s fiscal authority position but a fiscal leadership strategy leads to a 
Pareto improvement from the perspective of  both economic authorities and 
the societies they represent. Hence, a fiscal leadership strategy is not only the 
most efficient coordination solution, but also the most feasible one. 
The rest of  this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the two-
country model employed in this chapter, the reduced forms of  the model, 
and an analysis of  the inflation employment trade-offs faced by monetary and 
fiscal authorities under the two main regimes considered. The assessment of  
inflation employment trade-offs explains the intuition behind the free-riding 
opportunities enjoyed by the authorities of  small economies when they oper-
ate under non-cooperative regimes. Section 3 assesses the viability of  forming 
a monetary union in the absence of  fiscal policy consideration. Section 4 in-
troduces fiscal authorities that maximize society’s welfare and reconsiders the 
feasibility of  forming a monetary union between a small and a large economy. 
Once the convenience of  participating in a monetary union has been reassessed 
in the presence of  non-cooperative fiscal stances, this section also examines 
the viability of  engaging both economies in fiscal coordination by evaluating 
three different fiscal cooperation schemes: the simple coordination of  fiscal 
policymakers playing Nash against the monetary authority, and monetary and 
fiscal leadership. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the main conclusion and impli-
cations of  this paper.
Tѕђ њќёђљ 
The basic model we employ is based on Canzoneri and Henderson’s (1991) two-
country model. Asymmetric features are adopted from Ghironi and Giavazzi 
(1998) and Eichengreen and Ghironi (2002) who have used this model to analyze 
the optimal size of  a currency union and the case for transatlantic policy co-
ordination between the United States (U.S.) and Europe. In order to introduce 
fiscal policy considerations into the analysis, we follow Jensen (1991), Pizzati 
(2000), and Eichengreen and Ghironi (2002). 
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General framework 
In the model, all variables are expressed in logarithms except for the interest rate. 
Each economy specializes in the production of  one particular good. Aggregate 
supplies in both economies are increasing functions of  the employment rate (nj) 
and decreasing functions of  a productivity disturbance x:
yj = (1 – A)nj – x [1]
where 0 < A < 1 and j = h,f. The superscript  h denotes the variables of  a small 
home economy, an f those of  a large foreign economy (e.g. an already formed 
monetary union). For simplicity and tractability, we assume that the elasticity 
of  output with respect to employment, A, is the same for both economies. Total 
labor demand in each economy is determined by profit maximizing firms for 
which labor demand is complete when the marginal labor productivity is equal 
to the real wage:
wj – pj = – Anj – T j – x [2]
where T j, wj, and pj are, respectively, the rate of  taxation of  revenues, the nomi-
nal wage rate and the price of  the good produce by economy j. Consumer Price 
Indices (CPIs) are weighted averages of  the prices of  domestic and foreign 
goods. Residents in the home economy spend a fraction (1−B) of  their income 
on domestic goods and a fraction B on goods produced in the foreign economy. 
On the other hand, consumers in the foreign economy spend a fraction B of  
their income on their own goods and a fraction (1−B) on goods produced in 
the home economy. The CPIs are then described by:
qh = (1 – B)ph + B(pf + e) = ph + Bz
qf = Bpf + (1 – B)(ph – e) = pf – (1 – B)z
[3]
where qh and qf denote the CPIs of  the home and the foreign economies, and 
e and z = e + pf – ph are, respectively, the nominal and real exchange rates. In 
[3], B is an indicator of  the relative size of  the two economies and of  their 
integration toward each other. Notice that when B = ½ the two economies 
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are identical. As B rises the size of  the home economy shrinks, while that of  
the foreign economy increases. In the extreme case in which B = 1, the home 
economy is so small that it is not able to affect the foreign economy’s CPI at all. 
Demand is positively influenced by the output of  both economies according 
to the proportion of  income they allocate to domestic and foreign-produced 
goods. The marginal propensity to spend ε is the same for both goods and in 
both economies. Demand is also favorably affected by the two governments’ 
spending on domestic and foreign goods. Residents in the two economies re-
duce expenditure by the same amount (0 < U < 1) after an increase in the real 
interest rate rj. The market equilibrium conditions for the two economies are 
given by:
yh = DBz + E[Byf + (1 – B)yh] + [Bgf + (1 – B)gh] – vrh
yf = –D(1 – B)z + E[Byf + (1 – B)yh] + [Bgf + (1 – B)gh] – vrf
[4]
where D measures the sensitivity of  the demand to the real exchange rate (z) 
and ε is the marginal propensity to consume.
Clearly, a depreciation of  the real exchange rate shifts demand away from the 
foreign toward the home economy. Notice that when, for instance, B = 1 the real 
exchange rate does not affect the foreign economy at all. A priori, the ex-ante 
real interest rate in each economy is defined as the nominal interest rate minus 
the expected rate of  change in its consumer prices index:
r i E q qj j j j  ( )1 [5]
where ij is the nominal interest rate in economy j. Each economy issues bonds 
denominated in the domestic currency, which investors regard as perfect sub-
stitutes. They hold positive amounts of  both kinds of  bonds when expected 
interest rates measured in a common currency are equal to:
if = ih – E(e+1) + e [6]
Money demand in both economies is described by:
mj – pj = yj – Lij [7]
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where L > 0 and mj represent the nominal money supply in economy j. By 
substituting [1] and [2] into [7] we obtain the semi-reduced form for employ-
ment as:
nj = mj – wj – Tj + Lij [8]
Employment rises with increases in money supply and decreases with higher 
wage rates and taxes. In [8], the nominal interest rate has a positive effect on 
employment. At the end of  period t−1, trade unions set the nominal wage rate 
prevailing in period t. Their purpose is to minimize the expected deviations of  
employment from its full employment target (here normalized to zero). Thus, 
they minimize the following loss function:
W E nj j  
1
2 1
2( ) [9]
Substituting [8] into [9] and minimizing with respect to nj, we obtain the nominal 
wage rates set by the trade unions as:
wj = E[mj – Tj + Lij ] [10]
Trade unions set nominal wages according to the expected stances of  mon-
etary and fiscal policymakers in period t and the effect of  those stances on the 
domestic interest rate. In order to focus our attention on the role of  strategic 
interactions between the two economies and on the importance of  size asym-
metries for the choice of  the most appropriate exchange rate regime, we neglect 
the time inconsistency problems that might arise between the trade unions and 
the monetary and fiscal authorities in each economy.4 Since shocks are random 
and non-observable by unions at period t−1, in the absence of  time inconsis-
tency problems expected money supplies and taxes are equal to zero. Hence, 
the rational decision for trade unions is to set wages equal to zero, wj = 0.5
4  This is not unrealistic since, in principle, the Maastricht Treaty prevents the inflationary bias by 
stipulating that one-year before joining EMU, the accession country’s inflation rate should not exceed 
by more than 1.5% the average rate of  the three European Union (EU) countries where inflation is 
the lowest.
5  Interest rates in [8] also depend on shocks and on the stances of  the monetary and fiscal authorities.
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Finally, with no time inconsistency problems, the government budget 
constraint abstracts from seigniorage as a possible source of  revenue. Fiscal 
authorities face a budget constraint given by:
Tj = gj [11]
Since our framework is static, we assume that the fiscal authorities cannot is-
sue debt either and consequently are subject to a balanced budget constraint.6
Policymakers’ preferences 
The money supply is the only instrument that monetary authorities possess. 
They chose their instrument, mj, to minimize the quadratic loss functions des-
cribed by:
L n qCB
j j j ª¨ ·¹
1
2 1
2 2S ( ) ( ) [12]
The monetary authorities’ losses increase with deviations of  employment from 
zero and positive changes in their CPIs. The parameter σ reflects the weight that 
policymakers attach to employment and inflation deviations from their targets 
of  zero. In the event that the home and foreign economies decide to constitute 
a monetary union, a single central authority minimizes the weighted sum of  
both economies’ losses, as given by:
L L LMU CB
f
CB
h  B B( )1 [13]
For simplicity’s sake, we assume that the weight of  each economy in the central 
authority’s decisions is proportional to its size in the monetary union.7 
Fiscal authorities’ only policy instrument is the rate of  taxation of  revenues; 
hence, government spending is obtained residually. In addition to unemployment 
6  Consistent with SGP requirements, in our model fiscal deficits in both economies equal zero over time.
7  Considering the present size of  EMU, this assumption is to some extent consistent with the current 
voting system of  one country one vote and with the new proposed system of  rotating groups in 
which larger countries have more power in the European Central Bank’s monetary policy decisions 
and which will replace the former voting system as soon as the number of  member states in EMU 
exceeds 15 (European Council, 2003).
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and inflation, fiscal authorities dislike the volatility of  taxation and exchange 
rates. Fiscal authorities care about exchange rate volatility because of  its effect 
on society’s welfare in terms of  uncertainty and transaction costs and they dis-
like the volatility of  taxation due to the distortions it imposes on society. Thus, 
each fiscal authority chooses its instrument, Tj, to minimize:
L n qFA
j j j
j
j j
j
  

 ª¨ ·¹ 
1
2
1 1
1
2
3 3 2
2 2 2S S S T C
C
( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ),  
with S2
2
, ( )j eª¨ ·¹
[14]
where Cj is the cost that exchange rate volatility imposes on society’s welfare 
in economy j, S2,j, j represents the relative dislike of  the fiscal authorities for 
the volatility of  taxation and the nominal exchange rate, and S3 measures their 
relative dislike for employment and inflation. An important point to notice in 
equation [14] is the j subscript in S2,j. This suggests that, according to their 
relative size and integration with one another, the two economies’ dislike for 
the volatility of  taxation and the exchange rate may differ. As Bm1, the home 
economy becomes not only smaller but also increasingly integrated into the 
foreign economy; hence, the weight that the home fiscal authority attaches to 
the exchange rate volatility also increases. Notice that the greater the aversion 
of  the small economy for exchange rate volatility, the more its activism in fiscal 
policymaking grows (i.e. it reduces its dislike for the volatility of  taxation). In 
the event that the two economies form a single currency union, the nominal 
exchange rate volatility is no longer a concern for their residents (i.e. S2,j = 0). 
In that scenario, the loss function observed by the two fiscal authorities is 
identical and defined as:
L n qFA
j j j j  ª¨ ·¹
1
2
13 3
2 2 2S S T( ) ( )( ) ( ) [15]
where S3 measures the relative aversion of  the fiscal authorities for employment 
and inflation relative to taxation volatility.
For simplicity and tractability we consider the fiscal authority to be be-
nevolent and able to internalize the preferences of  the society. Following this 
assumption, to compare the societies’ welfare gains or losses across regimes 
we only need to contrast the fiscal authorities’ losses.
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Reduced forms 
In this section, we express the employment and inflation endogenous variables 
of  the model in terms of  exogenous, predetermined or control variables for the 
non-cooperative and monetary union regimes. 
Non-cooperative (flexible exchange rates) regime 
In the absence of  cooperation, each economy possesses its own currency and 
conducts its macroeconomic policy independently. Fiscal and monetary poli-
cymakers in both economies choose their instruments by playing Nash against 
each other.
Since the algebra to solve the reduced forms for employment and inflation 
under flexible exchange rates is cumbersome, we present the derivations of  
those expressions in Appendix A1. In compact notation and leaving the size 
parameters [B and (1–B)] clearly expressed, those reduced forms are summa-
rized as:
nh = [, – &B]mh + &Bmf – [7 + 1B]Th + 1BTf – Hx
nf = [, – &(1 – B)]mf + &(1 – B)mh – [7 + 1(1 – B)]Tf + 1(1 – B)Th – Hx
[16]
qh = [A + EB]mh – EBmf + [P – TB]Th + TBTf + 3x
qf = [A + E(1 – B)]mf – E(1 – B)mh + [P – T(1 – B)]Tf + T(1 – B)Th – 3x
[17]
where the capital Greek letters A, E, ,, &, 3 and H are a group of  positive non-
structural parameters of  the model defined in Table 1. In addition to shocks, 
employment and inflation in both economies are affected by intra-economy 
policy spillovers. For both economies, regardless of  their size, an increase in 
their own money supply raises domestic inflation and employment, while an 
expansion of  their neighbor’s money supply decreases domestic inflation and 
raises employment. An increase in domestic taxation raises inflation in both 
economies, causes domestic job losses and increases employment abroad. 
Meanwhile, the supply shock triggers unemployment and raises inflation in 
both economies. 
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Table 1
Non-structural parameters
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Observing the effect of  size asymmetries on these reduced forms, notice that 
when B = 1 the monetary and fiscal authorities in the trivially small home 
economy are incapable of  affecting the large foreign economy’s employment 
and inflation through changes in their monetary or fiscal stances. Meanwhile, 
when both economies are size symmetric (i.e. B = ½), they both affect each 
other equally.
Monetary union 
We consider now the case in which the home and foreign economies decide 
to constitute a monetary union. In this scenario, the nominal exchange rate 
disappears and the real exchange rate is simply determined by relative prices 
(i.e. e = 0 and z = pf – ph). Monetary policy is controlled by a single central bank 
that issues a single currency; hence, changes in the money supply are identi-
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cal in both economies. Taking this into consideration, the reduced forms for 
employment and inflation when the two economies take part in a monetary 
union are simply given by8:
nf = ,mu – [7 + N(1 – B)]Tf + N(1 – B)Th – Hx
nh = ,mu – [7 + NB]Th + NBTf – Hx
[18]
qf = Amu + [P – Q(1 – B)]Tf + Q(1 – B)Th + 3x
qh = Amu + [P – QB]Th + QBTf + 3x 
[19]
where mu is the money supply in the union and N and Q are positive non-
structural parameters defined in Table 1. Notice how under this regime the two 
economies are equally affected by the central authority’s monetary policy. An 
increase in the taxation of  revenues by either of  the two governments raises 
inflation in both economies, generates domestic job losses and increases employ-
ment abroad. Meanwhile, the supply shock reduces employment and increases 
inflation in the same direction and proportion as under flexible regimes.
Inflation-employment trade-oﬀs
Eichengreen and Ghironi (2002) show that under non-cooperative regimes, size 
asymmetries give rise to different inflation-employment trade-offs for policy-
makers.9 In general, they show that authorities in relatively smaller economies 
face more favorable employment-inflation trade-offs than those confronted 
by relatively larger economies. For instance, for the reduced forms presented in 
[16] and [17], the trade-off  faced by the central bank in the home economy is 
steeper as its size gets smaller (i.e. uqh/unh > uqf/unf for B > ½; see Appendix 
B1 for proof). 
8  These reduced forms are also fully derived in Appendix A2.
9  Utilizing a three-country version of  this model, Eichengreen and Ghironi (2002) study the determi-
nants of  policy trade-offs and incentives for central banks and governments in the U.S. and Europe. 
In their analysis, they consider the specific case of  policy coordination between the U.S. and an EMU 
that consists of  two economies of  equal size.
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The advantage of  having a steeper inflation-employment trade-off  for the 
small economy is illustrated graphically in Figure 1. As can be observed, a 
larger positive trade-off  allows the central bank in the small home economy 
to exchange a large (given) inflation reduction for a smaller employment loss. 
Hence, if  ―as we assume later― central banks care more about inflation than 
about employment (i.e. S1 < 1), a steeper trade-off  is also more advantageous 
for the small home economy.
Figure 1
Central banks’ inflation-employment trade-oﬀs
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A similar situation arises in the case of  fiscal authorities. For the reduced forms 
presented in [16] and [17], the trade-off  faced by the government in the home 
economy is flatter as its size gets smaller (i.e. –(uqh/unh) < uqf/unf for B > ½; 
see Appendix B2 for proof). As shown in Figure 2, the small economy’s fiscal 
authority is capable of  exchanging a higher (given) employment gain for a small 
price stability loss. Considering that fiscal authorities are more concerned about 
employment than about inflation, a negative flatter inflation-employment trade-
off  allows the government of  the home economy to hold a more favorable 
position regardless of  the exchange rate regime considered.
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Figure 2
Fiscal authorities’ inflation-employment trade-oﬀs
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Nevertheless, cooperation between the two economies’ monetary and fiscal 
authorities eliminates the advantage of  possessing a more favorable trade-off. 
Employing the reduced forms for the monetary union regime presented in [18] 
and [19], it is straightforward to show that once the home economy takes part 
in the monetary union, the inflation-employment trade-off  faced by the central 
monetary authority is one and the same for both economies. Irrespective of  the 
size of  the countries involved, the centralization of  monetary policy decisions 
provides the same inflation-employment trade-off  for both economies. The 
elimination of  their more favorable inflation-employment trade-off  will have 
an influence over the ability of  the home policymakers to react to shocks. In 
what follows, we first observe how relinquishing monetary policy independence 
―with and without fiscal policy considerations― affects the macroeconomic 
stability of  a small economy. Then, we examine how alternative fiscal coopera-
tion schemes can help to ameliorate the stabilization costs endured by the small 
economy that decides to take part in a monetary union.
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AѠѠђѠѠіћє ю њќћђѡюџѦ Ѣћіќћ џђєіњђ 
ѤіѡѕќѢѡ ѓіѠѐюљ ѝќљіѐѦ ѐќћѠіёђџюѡіќћѠ
The purpose of  this section is twofold. The first is to draw attention to the 
relevance of  size asymmetries for macroeconomic policymaking. The second 
is to set a point of  reference to analyze the role of  fiscal policy in macroeco-
nomic stabilization that we carry out in the next section. The starting point 
in this analysis is a situation where both economies have their own currency 
and policymaking is only delegated to central banks whose main objective is 
to achieve price stability. This forms the benchmark with which we assess the 
decision of  taking part in a monetary union. As in early studies exploring this 
issue (see for instance Martin, 1995; Lane, 1996 and 2000; Rantala, 2001), in this 
section fiscal authorities are excluded from the analysis. In order to do so, we 
simply eliminate the taxation of  revenues and the effect of  government spend-
ing from the equations in the general framework of  the model (i.e. equations 
[2], [4] and [11]). The resulting reduced forms under both regimes are identical 
to those in [16] to [19], setting Tj for j = h,f equal to zero.
To illustrate the importance of  size asymmetries on stabilization policies, we 
observe the policymaking process under two different states of  the world. In the 
first, we examine the constitution of  a monetary union between two economies 
of  equal size. In the second, we consider the case of  a small economy forming 
a monetary union with a considerably larger economy or region (e.g. an already 
formed monetary union).
Employing the reduced forms in [16] to [19] and the central banks prefer-
ences in [12] and [13], we solve the policy game under the two regimes consid-
ered by assigning numerical values to the structural parameters of  the model 
and computing the resulting equilibrium. The parameter values employed to 
solve the model are given by A = 0.34, D = 0.7, L = 0.34, U = 0.4, E = 0.65, and 
S1 = 0.2. These structural parameters are not assigned arbitrarily, but are justi-
fied based on empirical evidence or are set to reflect the expected environment 
faced by policymakers. A value of  A = 0.34 implies that from the original 
Cobb-Douglas production function where capital is constant and normalized to 
unity, labor requires two-thirds of  the total inputs.10 A choice of  D = 0.7 intends 
10  This proportion is consistently employed in different macroeconomic models calibration (see for 
instance Cooley and Prescott, 1995; Kiley, 2004; Andrés, Doménech, and Fatás, 2004).
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to reflect a high sensitivity of  trade to variations in the real exchange rate.11 
L = 0.34 is the mean value of  the elasticity of  the money demand with respect 
to the interest rate found by Knell and Stix (2003) in a survey of  500 individual 
money demand estimations. The values of  E = 0.65 is about the average of  
the marginal propensity to consume found by Osada (1999) for a group of  12 
industrial and developing economies. The parameter U = 0.4 is the same as the 
one employed by Ghironi and Giavazzi (1998) and Eichengreen and Ghironi 
(2002) in a numerical estimation of  a similar model.12 Finally, assuming that 
S1 = 0.2 realistically implies that the central banks care more about inflation 
than about employment.
For the two alternative states of  the world, we consider the values of  B = 0.5 
and B = 0.9. The first parameter value refers to the scenario in which the two 
economies are size symmetric, while the second corresponds to a state of  the 
world in which the home economy is only one-tenth of  the size of  the large 
foreign economy.
Flexible exchange rate regime. In the absence of  fiscal policy considerations, 
the central banks are the sole authorities responsible for dealing with stabili-
zation in the event that disturbances affect their economies. Under flexible 
exchange rates, individual central banks respond by contracting their money 
supplies to fight the inflationary pressure caused by the supply shock; a strategy 
that produces a negative externality on their neighbor via the real exchange 
rate. For instance, a decrease in the money supply of  the home economy will 
appreciate the exchange rate and then increase inflation in the foreign economy. 
Under the flexible exchange rate regime, both central bankers play Nash against 
each other and minimize their loss function in [12], taking the money supply 
of  their neighbor as given.
The solution to the minimization problem of  both central bankers yields 
the following First Order Conditions (FOC):
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11  This parameter value is consistent with empirical evidence testing the Marshall-Lerner condition which 
suggests that elasticity of  the demand with respect to imports and exports is usually below unity.
12  More details about the numerical reduced forms associated with this parameter value are presented 
in the following section.
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Solving the resulting two equations for mh and mf simultaneously, we obtain the 
equilibrium money supplies for both economies. Substituting those equilibrium 
money supplies in the employment and inflation reduced forms presented in 
[16] and [17], and then the resulting expressions in the loss functions of  the 
monetary authorities, we obtain the flexible exchange rate equilibrium outcomes 
presented in Table 2 for both states of  the world (B = 0.5 and B = 0.9).
Table 2
Welfare evaluations without fiscal authorities
A. Symmetric size economies (B = 0.5)
Flexible exchange rates Monetary union
Econ N q m uqj/unj LCB n q m uqj/unj LCB
f –1.685 0.043 –2.170 0.790 0.375 –1.077 0.634 –1.371 0.340 0.317
h –1.685 0.043 –2.170 0.790 0.375 –1.077 0.634 –1.371 0.340 0.317
B. Asymmetric size economies (B = 0.9)
Flexible exchange rates Monetary union
Econ N q m uqj/unj LCB n q m uqj/unj LCB
f 1.268 0.594 –1.618 0.427 0.337 –1.077 0.634 –1.371 0.340 0.317
h –1.528 0.260 1.992 1.180 0.267 –1.077 0.634 –1.371 0.340 0.317
Monetary union regime. By adopting a common currency, the members of  
a monetary union loose control over their own money supply. When a sym-
metric supply shock affects them, a central monetary authority that minimizes 
the weighted average of  the two economies’ losses contracts the world money 
supply to restore price stability in the union.
Considering that mj = mu for j = h,f, we obtain the equilibrium money supply 
set by the central monetary authority by minimizing the loss function defined 
in [13]. The central monetary authority minimization problem results in the 
following FOC:
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Solving this equation for mu, plugging the resulting equilibria in [18] and [19], 
and subsequently the expressions obtained on the loss functions of  the indi-
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vidual monetary authorities, we arrive at the monetary union regime equilibrium 
outcomes shown in Table 2.
We first contrast the equilibrium outcomes for the two regimes in the state 
of  the world in which a currency union is formed between two economies of  
equal size (i.e. B = 0.5). As can be observed in Table 2 Panel A, when the two 
economies are size symmetric the inflation-employment trade-offs (i.e. uqj/unj) 
they faced in each regime are identical. Under this state of  the world, gains from 
participating in a monetary union for both economies stem from ameliorating 
the externalities that each economy exerts on its neighbor through the real ex-
change rate. After adopting a common currency, the central monetary authority 
contracts the world money supply less aggressively than individual policymakers. 
By reducing the employment losses of  the two economies without increasing 
inflation substantially, adopting a common currency ultimately allows a better 
position for both economies in terms of  the losses they endure.
The implications of  the analysis change when we compare a state of  the world 
in which a monetary union is constituted between economies that differ in size 
(i.e. B = 0.9). As we observed earlier, under a non-cooperative regime the asym-
metries in the size of  the economies give rise to dissimilar inflation-employment 
trade-offs which are more favorable for a relatively smaller economy.
As shown in Table 2 panel B, while both economies continue attaining the 
same trade-off  by participating in a monetary union, the small economy’s faces 
a (steeper) more advantageous trade-off  than the large economy policymaker 
when it operates under a flexible regime. Due to its steeper trade-off, the small 
home economy’s policymaker is capable of  responding more effectively to the 
supply shock. As a result, the home money supply is contracted more aggres-
sively, thus shifting the inflation burden arising from the shock to the foreign 
economy and reducing domestic inflation more effectively.
Assessing the decision faced by the policymaker in the small economy about 
taking part in a monetary union, we observe that by abandoning the flexible 
regime the economy experiences considerably higher losses. Clearly, the small 
home economy would be better off  “free riding” from its size ―by using its 
own monetary policy― to counteract the inflationary pressure produced by 
the supply shock.13
13  As pointed out earlier, similar results were found by Martin (1995) studying the incentives for small 
open economies to join an already formed monetary union.
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Reassessing participation in a monetary union
From now on, we concentrate on the asymmetric state of  the world (i.e. the 
case when B = 0.9). The timing of  events is similar to that described earlier in 
the absence of  fiscal policy considerations. At period t−1, trade unions form 
expectations and set wages accordingly. Thereafter, at period t, the shock x is 
realized and observed by monetary and fiscal authorities in both economies. 
Following this, under the flexible exchange rate regime the four authorities chose 
their instruments simultaneously taking the actions of  the other policymakers 
as given. The exchange rate is then endogenously determined according to the 
responses of  the four policymakers to the shock. The nominal exchange rate 
reduced form is shown in Appendix A1 to be:
e = –J(mf – mh) + R(Tf – Th) [22]
where J and R are defined in Table 1. Given the forms of  the respective prefer-
ences of  monetary and fiscal authorities described in [12] and [14], monetary 
authorities reduce their money supplies to ameliorate the inflation pressure 
provoked by the shock and fiscal authorities decrease taxation to counteract 
the reduction in employment. As a result, the actions of  monetary and fiscal 
authorities have opposite effects over the nominal exchange rate. For instance, 
when ―in response to a supply shock― the home monetary authority reduces 
its money supply (by more than the foreign central bank thanks to its steeper 
trade-off), this appreciates the nominal exchange rate. Meanwhile, the reduc-
tion in taxation by the home fiscal authority (above the foreign fiscal authority) 
reduces the extent of  the appreciation and brings the nominal exchange rate 
back towards its original level.
In the presence of  fiscal policy considerations, monetary authorities con-
tinue to minimize the loss function described by equation [12]. Meanwhile, 
fiscal authorities minimize the deviations of  employment, inflation, taxes and 
the nominal exchange rate from zero, as shown in equation [14]. The prefer-
ences of  the fiscal authorities, under flexible exchange rates feature the values 
of  S21 = 0.06, S22 = 0.6, and S3 = 0.9. Numerically, these values provide the 
following loss functions:
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Following Eichengreen and Ghoroni (2002), the above parameters are calibrated 
with roughly a five-fold higher weight on employment than on inflation and 
a higher concern for fiscal policy volatility than for price stability. However, 
in contrast to Eichengreen and Ghironi (2002), we weight nominal exchange 
rate volatility in the fiscal authority (and the societies) preferences. We place an 
unequal and asymmetric weight on fiscal policy (taxes) and nominal exchange 
rate volatility for both economies. Given its higher openness towards the for-
eign economy and its relative smaller size, the home economy is ten times more 
sensitive to exchange rate volatility than the foreign economy. As shown later, 
these parameters are consistent with the policymakers expected trade-offs.
In order to make the fiscal authorities’ preferences consistent with the size 
of  the two economies and their integration towards each other, we assume that 
the small economy cares ten times more about the volatility of  the exchange 
rate than the large economy. Its higher dislike for variations of  the exchange rate 
increases the activism of  the government in managing fiscal policy (i.e. reduces 
the home fiscal authority’s dislike for taxation volatility). Finally, both policy-
makers care more about employment than about inflation.
Under the monetary union regime, the adoption of  a common currency 
eliminates the exchange rate volatility concern from the fiscal authorities’ loss 
functions. As a result, the preferences of  the fiscal authorities are described by 
[15]. Numerically, the loss functions minimized by the two fiscal authorities are 
in this case identical and given by:
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In the absence of  exchange rate volatility, the activism of  two authorities is 
reduced and they continue to care more about employment than about infla-
tion. Meanwhile, the central monetary authority minimizes the weighted sum 
of  both central banks’ losses as described in equation [13].
Using the structural parameter values defined above (A = 0.34, D = 0.7, L = 
0.34, U = 0.4 and E = 0.65), the reduced forms under flexible exchange rates (in 
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[16] and [17]) and the monetary union regime (in [18] and [19]) are numerically 
presented in Table 3. As expected, foreign instruments have considerably higher 
impact on home employment and inflation than home instruments on foreign 
variables. Only when a monetary union is constituted, the impact of  the union’s 
money supply is the same in both economies’ employment and inflation.
Table 3
Numerical reduced forms
A. Flexible regime
nh = 0.703mh + 0.59mf – 0.877Th + 0.503Tf – 0.033x
nf = 0.756mf + 0.006mh – 0.429Tf + 0.056Th – 0.033x
qh = 0.829mh – 0.570mf + 0.501Th + 0.372Tf + 0.989x
qf = 0.323mf – 0.063mh + 0.831Tf + 0.041Th + 0.989x
B. Monetary union
nh = 0.762mu- – 0.870Th + 0.496Tf – 0.033x
nf = 0.762mu + 0.428Tf + 0.055Th – 0.033x
qh = 0.259mu – 0.479Th + 0.393Tf + 0.989x
qf = 0.259mu – 0.830Tf + 0.044Th + 0.989x
Flexible exchange rate regime. Employing the loss functions in [23], under the 
flexible ex-change rates the fiscal authorities’ minimization problem yields 
the following two FOCs:
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Meanwhile, central banks continue to face the FOCs defined in [20]. Plugging the 
numerical reduced forms in Table 3 on the FOCs in [20] and [26], and solving 
simultaneously for mj and Tj, we obtain the equilibrium outcomes presented 
in Table 4 panel A.
Contrasting the equilibrium outcomes for the flexible exchange rate regimes 
in Tables 1 (panel B) and 4 (panel A), the first thing to notice is how both central 
bankers operating under flexible exchange rate regimes are better off  once fiscal 
authorities exert their own effort towards stabilization.
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Following the inflation and unemployment tolls yielded by the shock, the 
actions of  the fiscal policymakers produce a positive externality on the central 
bankers. This happens because the contraction of  taxes ―and hence government 
spending― by the fiscal authorities reduces inflation. Nonetheless, this positive 
externality does not extend to the actions of  the central bankers.
Table 4
Welfare evaluations with fiscal authorities
A. Flexible exchange rates Trade-oﬀs Losses
Econ n q m T LCB CB FA LCB LFA
f –1.685 0.043 –2.170 0.790 0.375 0.427 –1.937 0.128 0.335
h –1.685 0.043 –2.170 0.790 0.375 1.180 –0.571 0.025 0.331
B. Monetary union without fiscal coordination Trade-oﬀs Losses
Econ n q m T LCB CB FA LCB LFA
f 1.268 0.594 –1.618 0.427 0.337 0.340 –1.935 0.126 0.150
h –1.528 0.260 1.992 1.180 0.267  0.340 –0.551 0.082 0.135
Following the supply shock, the tightening of  the central banks’ money supplies 
reduces the level of  employment in conjunction with the shock. Hence, the 
stabilization efforts of  the central bankers produce a negative externality on 
the fiscal authorities that care more about employment than about inflation.
Comparing the equilibrium outcomes for the two economies under flexible 
exchange rates in Table 4, we observe how the flatter inflation employment 
trade-off  faced by the small economy’s fiscal authority allows it to (contract taxes 
more aggressively and) experience lower unemployment. Similarly, as a result 
of  its steeper trade-off, the central banker in the small economy (contracts its 
money supply by more than its counterpart and) experiences less inflation.14 
The combination of  lower inflation and unemployment results in considerably 
lower losses for the small economy’s central banker. On the other hand, despite 
its more favorable trade-off, the activism required to reduce unemployment 
(i.e. a larger contraction of  Th) and its higher concern for the volatility of  the 
exchange rate lead the fiscal authority in the small economy to endure similar 
losses to those of  its counterpart in the large economy.
14  The trade-offs faced by monetary authorities are obviously the same as those presented before 
for the analysis of  stabilization policies without fiscal authorities.
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Monetary union regime. Under this arrangement, the fiscal authorities’ mini-
mization problem yields the following two FOCs:
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Meanwhile, using [13] the central monetary authority FOC is given by:
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Solving the FOCs in [27] and [28] simultaneously for mu and Tj, we obtain the 
equilibrium outcomes presented in Table 4 panel B.
Looking at the desirability of  taking part in the monetary union, we observe 
that giving up monetary policy implies the small economy abandoning its abil-
ity to exploit the exchange rate to react to the shock (i.e. giving up its more 
favorable trade-off). As a result, the small economy experiences more inflation 
than under the flexible regime. In terms of  employment, the fiscal authority 
retains its flatter trade-off  and endures fewer job losses than its counterpart 
after the formation of  the monetary union. However, the lower contraction 
of  the central authority’s money supply and the higher concern of  the fiscal 
authorities for the taxation of  revenues (i.e. its lower activism in fiscal policy 
once the exchange rate volatility is eliminated) produce a less aggressive reac-
tion from the small economy’s fiscal authority. As a result, both unemployment 
and inflation are larger for the small economy under the monetary union than 
under the flexible regime. This results in considerably larger losses from the 
monetary authority’s perspective.
Nevertheless, participating in the monetary union allows the small economy’s 
fiscal authority to reduce the social welfare losses arising after the shock. There 
are two explanations for this result. The first is that under the monetary union 
regime the exchange rate volatility disappears and that eliminates the level of  
losses suffered by its society in terms of  transaction costs and uncertainty. 
The second has to do with the reduction in the volatility of  taxation. Although the 
small economy experiences higher inflation and unemployment by participating 
in the monetary union than operating under a flexible regime, the less aggressive 
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response of  the central monetary authority and the absence of  exchange rate 
volatility concerns challenge a lower restraining of  taxes by the fiscal authority. 
This reduces the welfare losses associated with a fall in taxation of  revenues 
and government spending.
Despite the lower social welfare losses arising under the monetary union 
regime, inflation and employment are larger than under the non-cooperative 
regime. In episodes of  prolonged instability, this of  course would be a cause 
for concern for monetary and fiscal authorities. Particular discomfort may arise 
in the foreign large economy, as it endures more inflation and unemployment 
than the small economy. In what follows, we explore whether fiscal coordina-
tion can help to ameliorate the inflation and unemployment experienced by the 
members of  the monetary union.
Fiscal coordination
The treaty establishing the European Union provides some room for fiscal 
coordination by suggesting that “Member states shall regard their economic 
policy as a matter of  common concern and shall coordinate them within the 
(European) Council”.15 Nevertheless, up until now, coordination in the EU has 
not involved explicit cooperation schemes between fiscal authorities at the 
Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) level or a full formal agree-
ment between the ECB and the ECOFIN Council.
Although coordination among authorities thus far has been rather limited 
to the commitment towards the rules imposed by the SGP and the mutual atten-
dance of  ECB and ECOFIN representatives at each other’s Council meetings, the 
interaction of  monetary and fiscal policy remains an increasingly crucial issue 
for the EU, especially as the monetary union is continuously preparing to em- 
brace additional members. Indeed, bringing together the presence of  a supra-
national monetary authority and coordinated fiscal agents is an interesting 
research topic that is relevant for the future design of  Europe’s fiscal and mon-
etary institutions.
In this section we explore a simple cooperation scheme in which fiscal au-
thorities in both economies are coordinated by a central fiscal authority but no 
involvement of  the monetary authority exists (i.e. fiscal authorities cooperate 
15  Extract from the Treaty of  Amsterdam, Article 99 (European Council, 1997).
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against the central monetary authority). In other words, monetary and fiscal 
central authorities play Nash against each other. While the monetary authority 
chooses the money supply of  the union, the fiscal authority sets the rate for 
the taxation of  revenues. Under fiscal cooperation, the central authority that 
coordinates fiscal policymaking in the monetary union minimizes the weighted 
sum of  the two fiscal authorities’ loss functions:
min L L LFU FA
f
FA
h    	B B1 [29] 
with respect to the fiscal authority instruments Tf and Th. The corresponding 
FOCs of  this minimization problem are:
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[30]
Substituting the numerical reduced forms for the monetary union regime 
presented in Table 3 and solving the system of  three equations involving [28] 
and [30], the resulting equilibrium outcomes for the regime are presented in 
Table 5 panel 
Assuming that the central fiscal authority harmonizes the taxation of  
revenues in the two economies (i.e. that T = TH = TF) and that it minimizes the 
weighted sum of  the two fiscal authorities loss function (as shown in [29]), we 
obtain exactly the same outcomes for both economies in Table 5.16
As in the case of  monetary unification (without fiscal cooperation), coordi-
nation of  fiscal policies leads to a less aggressive response of  the central fiscal 
authority to the shock. This happens because centralization of  fiscal stances 
allows the fiscal authorities to internalize (and eliminate) the negative external 
effects that a larger contraction of  taxes by both economies has on each other’s 
employment. However, this less significant contraction by the fiscal authority 
translates into a smaller positive externality on price stability. Consequently, the 
16  This is analogue to what we obtained in Table 2 when the central monetary authority decides on a 
single monetary policy instrument.
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central monetary authority responds more aggressively to the shock than in the 
absence of  fiscal coordination.
For the two economies involved in the regime, the more aggressive reac-
tion of  the central monetary authority to the shock and the weaker response 
of  the central fiscal authority lead to higher inflation and unemployment than 
in the absence of  fiscal coordination. As a result, despite the lower activism of  
fiscal policy (i.e. the lower contraction of  taxes than under no coordination), both 
economies experience higher losses from a monetary or fiscal perspective.
Hence, centralization of  fiscal policies results in a counterproductive strategy 
for the members of  the monetary union.
Table 5
Welfare evaluations for alternative forms of coordination
A. Monetary union with fiscal coordination Losses
Econ n q m T e LCB LFA
f –0.714 0.420 –1.059 –0.338 - 0.140 0.157
h –0.714 0.420 –1.059 –0.338 - 0.140 0.157
B. Monetary union Stackelberg leader  Losses
Econ n q m T e LCB LFA
f –0.928 0.275 –1.377 –0.410 - 0.124 0.254
h –0.928 0.275 –1.377 –0.410 - 0.124 0.254
C. Fiscal authority Stackelberg leader  Losses
Econ n q m T e LCB LFA
f –0.463 0.272 –0.845 –0.570 - 0.059 0.128
h –0.463 0.272 –0.845 –0.570 -  0.059 0.128
In order to control for the more aggressive reaction of  the central monetary 
authority and the weaker response of  the central fiscal authority, coordination 
can be extended to harmonize the stabilization efforts of  both policymakers. 
In what follows, we examine coordination schemes comprising the fiscal and 
the monetary central authorities committed to following each other’s stabiliza-
tion efforts.
Monetary and fiscal policy coordination
Since fiscal policy centralization against the monetary authority results in a 
counterproductive strategy for the members of  a monetary union, in this section 
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we explore forms of  international coordination that involve synchronizing the 
stabilization effort of  both fiscal and monetary central authorities. We present 
the solution for two alternative arrangements. In the first, the central monetary 
authority acts as a Stackelberg leader, while in the second the fiscal authority acts 
as such. Under both arrangements, the authority that acts as leader minimizes 
its own losses, taking into account the reaction of  the other player.17
Monetary leadership. First, we consider the case where, following the supply 
shock, the central monetary authority chooses the money supply for the union, 
taking into account the response of  the central fiscal authority to its actions. In 
this case, the monetary authority’s problem is to:
min L L LMU CB
f
CB
h    	B B1
s.t.: FOCs in [30]
[31]
Employing the reduced forms in Table 3, the resulting equilibrium for the 
monetary leadership regime is presented in Table 5 panel B.
The more significant the monetary authority’s reaction to the disturbance, the 
more aggressively the fiscal authority responds after the shock. This is because 
a greater contraction of  the money supply triggers more unemployment which 
the fiscal authority tries to ameliorate by cutting taxes. This, of  course, creates 
a larger positive externality for the central monetary authority.
Hence, the latter takes advantage of  its leadership to contract its money 
supply more aggressively than in previous regimes. As a result, it is capable 
of  achieving lower inflation and losses than under no cooperation with the 
central fiscal authority. Nonetheless, due to the more aggressive reaction by 
both authorities, unemployment and taxation volatility increase considerably; 
as a result, social welfare losses significantly exceed those under the previous 
regimes (i.e. monetary union without fiscal cooperation or pure coordination of  
fiscal authorities playing Nash against the central bank). In the end, cooperation 
under monetary leadership is counterproductive for the fiscal authorities and 
the societies they represent.
17  For some insight into the implementation of  fiscal coordination schemes like those we have pro-
posed, see, for instance, Fatás et al. (2003) and von Hagen (2004).
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Fiscal leadership. When the fiscal authority acts as the leader and the monetary 
authority as the follower, the optimization problem of  the former is defined 
as follows:
min L L LFU FA
f
FA
h    	B B1
s.t.: FOCs in [28]
[32]
The equilibrium outcomes for this arrangement when employing the numerical 
reduced forms presented in Table 3 are shown in Table 5 panel C.
Comparing the outcomes in Table 5 panels B and C with those in panel 
A, it is apparent that whoever has the first mover advantage determines the 
equilibrium ranking of  inflation, employment and welfare for the two authori-
ties. In the event that the fiscal authority acts as Stackelberg leader, it also uses 
its first mover advantage to reduce unemployment more actively than in the 
absence of  coordination. It realizes that ―despite its aversion for the volatility 
of  taxation― a more contractionary fiscal policy conveys a positive externality 
over the monetary authority which responds by tightening its money supply less 
aggressively after the shock. Hence, by challenging a lower money supply con-
traction from the central monetary authority, the fiscal authority also achieves 
considerably lower employment losses. The combination of  lower inflation 
and unemployment with a moderate cutback in taxes leads to a reduction in 
the losses experienced by monetary and fiscal authorities. As a result, the fiscal 
leadership strategy brings a Pareto gain from the perspective of  all the policy-
makers involved and the societies they represent.
Ranking the social welfare losses experienced by both economies over all 
the arrangements examined, it is clear that the fiscal leadership strategy makes 
engaging in monetary and fiscal coordination attractive for the residents of  both 
economies and their authorities. Fiscal leadership is preferred by policymakers to 
a monetary union where fiscal authorities play Nash against the central monetary 
authority and to a monetary leadership regime. Moreover, the fiscal leadership 
regime is superior to a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in which both countries 
have their own currency and possess their own fiscal policy.
In terms of  feasibility, whether a fiscal leadership regime can be a realistic 
option for EMU would depend on the commitment of  fiscal and monetary 
authorities to achieving effective coordination. Lambertini and Rovelli (2004) 
suggest that looking at the fiscal authority as the leader is naturally embedded in 
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the institutional policymaking process. This happens because in practice fiscal 
policy is set prior to monetary policy and revised much less frequently. Typically, 
fiscal policy is defined on an annual basis, whereas monetary policy is constantly 
monitored and may change several times over the course of  a year. These 
circumstances point towards the fiscal authority as the natural first mover (i.e. 
the Stackelberg leader), a situation that in our model is indeed desirable for the 
policymakers and the residents of  both economies.
CќћѐљѢѠіќћ
The aim of  this paper has been to assess the desirability of  taking part in a 
monetary union from the perspective of  a small open economy. The paper ad-
dresses two important questions. The first is whether participation in a monetary 
union is desirable for a small open economy. We find that, leaving fiscal policy 
considerations aside, it is straightforward to conclude that participation in a 
monetary union is counterproductive for a small economy. The key point to 
this result is that a small open economy is better off  “free riding”, and using 
its own monetary policy to counteract the inflationary pressures produced by 
supply shocks.
Following this result, we expand the analysis to consider the interactions be-
tween fiscal and monetary authorities on macroeconomic stabilization. We find 
that, once representative fiscal policymakers are incorporated into the model, 
taking part in the monetary union becomes desirable from a social welfare 
perspective. The reason for this is that, by taking part in stabilization, fiscal au-
thorities concerned about employment respond to the shock by reducing taxes 
and spending, thus offsetting inflationary pressures and ameliorating unemploy-
ment. In addition, under a monetary union regime, the absence of  exchange 
rate volatility and the reduction in taxation are both factors that contribute to 
decreasing the losses that society experiences in the face of  the shock.
The second question this paper explores is whether monetary and fiscal 
coordination can help to improve the macroeconomic stability of  the members 
of  a monetary union. Evaluating three alternative forms of  cooperation, shows 
that the pure coordination of  fiscal authorities (playing Nash against the central 
monetary authority) results in a counterproductive strategy for both economies. 
On harmonizing the interaction between fiscal and monetary authorities, we 
find that while a monetary leadership strategy results in a deterioration of  the 
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position of  the small economy’s fiscal authority’s position, a fiscal leadership 
strategy leads to a Pareto improvement from the perspective of  both economic 
authorities and the societies they represent. With respect to the latter finding, 
we concur with other papers in the literature in suggesting that, given the timing 
required to implement and change monetary and fiscal policies, a fiscal leader-
ship strategy is not only the most efficient coordination solution, but also the 
most feasible one.
Clearly, our model leaves aside many issues that are potentially relevant for 
small open economies facing the decision of  participating in a monetary union. 
First, although we try to set asymmetric structures, our model assumes, for 
instance, that labor productivity in the two economies is the same. Integration 
could potentially create this effect but in the short term this may not be the 
case. Second, we assume a balanced budget constraint for the two economies. 
Indeed the SGP aims at “balanced budget or in surplus in the medium term” 
but this hardly means that debt should be excluded from the analysis in the 
short term.18 At least in the short run, debt sustainability deserves more atten-
tion. Finally, this paper does not address the mechanism through which the 
coordination schemes examined here could be implemented. Clearly, the com-
mitment of  fiscal and monetary policymakers is necessary in order to achieve 
effective cooperative solutions like the ones we have proposed. However, the 
necessary agreements and mechanisms to achieve coordination are beyond 
the scope of  this paper.
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A. Dђџіѣюѡіќћ ќѓ ѡѕђ џђёѢѐђё ѓќџњѠ ќѓ ѡѕђ њќёђљ
A1. Flexible exchange rates
We start by obtaining the reduced forms for the flexible regime. Utilizing [8] and 
assuming wj = 0, the semi-reduced form for employment becomes simply:
nj = mj – T + Lij [A.1]
To obtain the home price semi-reduced form, we solve [2] for pj to arrive t:
pj = Anj – Tj + x [A.2]
Substituting the employment semi-reduced form into [A.2] we obtain that:
pj = Amj – (1 – A)Tj + Lij + x [A.3]
The derivation of  the real exchange rate reduced form requires several steps. 
Using equation [6] and assuming no speculative bubbles, we define the nominal 
exchange rates as:
 e = if – ih [A.4]
Solving z for e and substituting [A.3] into the resulting expression, the nominal 
exchange rate semi-reduced form is simply:
e z m mf h f h

    ª¨ ·¹
1
1
1
AL
A A T T( ) ( )( ) [A.5]
Now, subtracting home supply and demand in [1] and [4] from those same 
expressions for the foreign economy, we obtain that:
yf – yh = (1 + A)(nf – nh)] [A.6]
yf – yh = –Dz [A.7]
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Substituting the employment semi-reduced form in [A.1] into [A.6] and plug-
ging equation [A.5] into [A.7], equalizing the two expressions and solving for 
z, the resulting real exchange rate reduced form is simply:
z = '[(mf – mh) + (1 + L)(Tf – Th)] [A.8]
where '  
  
1
1 1
A
AL D A L( ) ( )
. To obtain the nominal exchange rate reduced 
form, simply substitute [A.8] into [A.5] to obtain:
e = if – ih = –F(mf – mh) + R(Tf – Th) [A.9]
where F A AD
AL D A L

 
  
1
1 1( ) ( )
 and R = (1 − D)'. 
Now, we need to obtain the interest rate reduced forms. Using [5] and as-
suming no speculative bubbles, it follows that:
rw = iw + qw [A.10]
Since real exchange movements cancel each other around the world and shocks 
are symmetric, it can be shown that qw = pw and xw = x. Using [A.3] rw can be 
expressed as:
rw = Amw + (1 – A)Tw + (1 + AL)iw + x [A.11]
World demand is given by the weighted sum of  the demands in the two econo-
mies. Using [4], the world demand is equal to:
yw = Byf + (1 – B)yh = Eyw + gw – vrw [A.12]
Solving for rw we obtain that the world real interest rate is simply:
r y gw w w  1 1E
U U
[A.13]
On the other hand, using [1] and [8], the world supply can be written as:
yw = (1 – A)nw – x = (1 – A)[mw – Tw + Liw] – x [A.14]
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Substituting the above expression on [A.13], it follows that:
r m i x gw w w w w       ( )( ) [ ]1 1 1 1E A
U
T L
E
U U
[A.15]
Equalizing [A.11] and [A.15] and solving for iw, we obtain:
i i i m xw w h w w      B B X
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Q
( )1 [A.16]
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1 1 1( )( ) . To obtain the interest rate reduced forms we 
combine [A.9] and [A.16] to obtain:
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where $ = J – X/Q and P = W/Q − R. 
Finally, we employ the domestic prices [A.3], interest rates [A.18] and real 
exchange rate in [A.8] to obtain the employment and inflation reduced forms 
under a flexible regime presented in [16] and [17].
A2. Monetary union regime
Following the adoption of  a common currency, money supply in the union is 
controlled by the central monetary authority. Since there are only two countries, 
the central monetary authority has full command over the world money sup-
ply (i.e. mu = mw). The nominal exchange rate disappears once the two eco- 
nomies employ a single currency; hence the real exchange rate becomes simple 
z = pf − ph.
Plugging the equations for the price semi-reduced form defined in [A.2] on 
z, considering that mu = mj and solving for if − ih, we obtain:
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i i zf h   ; =1 1
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Equalizing [A.7] and [A.6], substituting [A.19] and solving for z we obtain the 
real exchange rate reduced form:
z = I(Tf – Tf) [A.20]
where I A
A AD


 
1
1
. Substituting [A.20] into [A.19] we obtain that:
if – ih = k(Tf – Th) [A.21]
where K A D
A AD L

 
 
( )( )
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1
. Combining equations [A.21] and [A.16], the interest 
rate reduced forms are given by:
i m x
i m
f u f h
h u
    ¨
ª©
·
¹¸
  
   ¨
ª©
·
¹
X
Q
W
Q
H B T H B T
Z
Q
X
Q
W
Q
HB
( ) ( )1 1
¸  T HBT
Z
Q
h f x
[A.22]
Finally, we employ the domestic prices [A.3], interest rates [A.22] and real ex-
change rate in [A.20] to obtain the employment and inflation reduced forms 
under the monetary union presented in [18] and [19].
B. Tџюёђ-ќѓѓ ѝџќќѓѠ
B1. Proof that a smaller economy’s monetary authority
faces a steeper trade-oﬀ
The trade-offs for both economies’ monetary authorities are given by:
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The statement that a small economy faces a steeper trade-off  implies that:
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Cross multiplying both sides we obtain that this requires:
AF[B – (1 – B)] > –,E[B – (1 – B)]  [B.3]
Providing that the capital Greek letters are positive, this inequality holds if  B > 
(1−B). That is, whenever the home economy is relatively smaller than the foreign 
economy. Intuitively, the smaller home economy consumes a larger proportion 
of  its goods from the foreign one. Therefore, a contraction of  its money supply, 
which appreciates the exchange rate produces a larger reduction of  its CPI.
B2. Proof that a smaller economy’s fiscal authority 
faces a flaĴer trade-oﬀ
The trade-offs for both economies’ monetary authorities are given by:
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The statement that a small home economy faces a steeper trade-off  implies 
that:
–[P – TB][7 + 1(1 – B)] > –[P – T(1 – B)][7 + 1B] [B.5]
Simplifying this expression shows that the domestic economy has a flatter trade-
off  when B > (1−B). A similar proof  can be derived by employing the reduced 
forms for the monetary union regime.
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DISCUSIÓN

The EI interview: Professor Photis Lysandroua 
by Noemi Levyb
1. Were you in favour of Greece joining the euro?
No, I was not, and in fact, I addressed a conference on this issue in Athens in 
2001 shortly before Greece joined the eurozone arguing against this policy. 
The reason I gave was that Greece’s structural and institutional conditions 
at the time were simply not robust enough to allow Greece to cope with the 
constraints of  a uniform exchange rate and monetary policy. This position was 
also that of  the leading authorities behind the euro project up to about early 
2001. Before the Asian currency crisis of  the summer of  1997, it was expected 
that 5-7 EU countries would join the euro, in other words, only those that met all 
the stringent pre-entry fiscal criteria (debt and deficit to GDP ratios) and monetary 
criteria (inflation rate and interest rate). After that crisis, the entry conditions 
were loosened to the point where 14 of  the then 15 EU member countries were 
invited to join the euro, Greece alone being the exception because its record on 
all of  the pre-entry criteria was so abysmal. The European authorities argued 
that Greece should first introduce radical structural and institutional reforms 
before joining the euro, while the Greek authorities put the contrary view that 
the economic and financial stability conferred on Greece by virtue of  euro 
entry would provide just the kind of  macroeconomic framework necessary 
to achieve the required structural and institutional changes. The Greek view 
somehow prevailed and Greece was allowed to join the euro in January 2002. 
a  Photis Lysandrou is currently research professor at the Political Economy Research Centre in City 
University (CITYPERC), London. His research interests are in the areas of  history of  economic thought, 
Marx’s monetary theory, corporate governance, globalisation and global finance. He has published on all 
these topics in Journals such as Cambridge Journal of  Economics, Journal of  Post Keynesian Economics, Journal 
of  Common Studies, and Economy and Society. Professor Lysandrou gave a series of  lectures at School of  
Economics at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) during September, 2015.
b  Professor at the School of  Economics at UNAM (Mexico), <levy@unam.mx>.
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Needless to say, rather than pursuing any serious radical economic programme 
behind the currency stability shelter provided by euro membership, the Greek 
political, business and banking elites simply took advantage of  that stability to 
promote their own vested interests.
2. What were the consequences for the Greek economy arising out of euro 
membership?
The key benefit to Greece from joining the eurozone was an end to the currency 
depreciation-domestic inflation spiral that had plagued the Greek economy in 
the previous decades. Thus between 1978 and 2001, the Greek drachma’s rate 
against the European Currency Unit ( ECU) fell from about 48 to 340, with the 
result that the domestic inflation rate was on average about 25% higher than 
the EU average over this same period. Following entry into the euro, Greece’s 
domestic inflation rate fell to about 1.5% above the eurozone average, a result 
less of  above average domestic wages (these in fact lagged behind the eurozone 
average) than of  below average productivity levels. However, the main downside 
of  membership of  a single strong currency was that this gave impetus to the 
de-industrialisation of  the Greek economy ―as many Greek manufacturing 
businesses relocated to the Balkans where labour costs were even lower than in 
Greece― and to its further transformation into a pure ‘service’ economy, with 
the two principal keystones in this regard being shipping and tourism.
3. What were the reasons behind Greece’s economic crisis?
Before answering this question, let me first look at how all the countries in 
the eurozone periphery suffered in the crisis. Before the creation of  the euro, 
government, financial and corporate bonds issued in the smaller member states 
of  the EU typically carried higher than average yields because currency risk in 
addition to credit risk was factored into the prices of  these bonds. With the 
establishment of  the euro, the yields on the bonds of  the peripheral member 
countries converged towards those on German bonds ―Germany being by 
far the strongest eurozone economy― because of  the elimination of  currency 
risk. What of  course then happened is that the private commercial banks in 
countries such as Ireland, Portugal and Spain, seeing the massive profit oppor-
tunities offered by the low interest rates in the wholesale euro money markets, 
borrowed massively in these short term markets in order to lend long term 
loans (mortgage loans in particular, but also other credit loans) at higher interest 
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rates in their domestic economies. When the subprime crisis which broke out 
in the summer of  2007 undermined confidence in the world’s leading money 
markets causing short term interest rates to raise sharply, many European 
commercial banks (all of  the large ones in the case of  the Republic of  Ireland) 
went bankrupt. The case of  Greece was somewhat different in that many large 
Greek commercial banks were exposed less to the domestic housing sector than 
to the Greek government that had taken advantage of  the low interest rates 
on eurozone government bonds to massively expand its borrowing level. It is 
beyond doubt that German and other foreign banks were complicit in driving 
up Greece’s public debt as they were only too happy to buy Greek governments 
bonds which, despite euro membership, still generated a yield premium over 
German and other core eurozone government bonds. This said, the fact remains 
that both the Pasok and New Democracy governments ―unwilling or unable 
to collect taxes on the scale required to meet the increasing demands on the 
public finances― simply took the easy way out by issuing increasing amounts 
of  government bonds. When the crisis broke out, and the yield premiums on 
peripheral eurozone country bonds soared, it was Greece that suffered the 
worst because of  the sheer scale of  outstanding public debt.
4. What are the alternatives for the post-crisis Greek economy?
When Syriza won the election in January 2015, it had campaigned on the basis of  
two promises: to end the harsh austerity measures imposed by Greece’s creditors 
as the precondition for its bail-out and to keep Greece in the eurozone. Despite 
every effort to keep both promises, it ultimately failed (largely because of  the 
strength of  Germany’s opposition to any softening of  the bail-out terms) and 
was thus faced with a stark choice: either to accept the foreign creditor’s terms 
and remain in the euro or reject the terms, default on the external debt and 
thus face the likelihood of  euro exit. The Left Platform of  Syriza ―a far left 
group that has since split off  and formed the Popular Unity party― insisted 
that Grexit was the better of  the two alternatives because the repudiation of  
the debt would give Greece elbow room to grow while a return to the drachma 
would boost Greece’s international trade competitiveness to the point required 
to actually generate economic growth. All this sounds fine in theory, but the 
grim reality is very different. I have already mentioned the fact that prior to 
euro entry, Greece was locked in a vicious currency depreciation-internal 
inflation spiral. Close inspection of  the current state of  the Greek economy 
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―heavily import dependent in virtually every major industrial and technologi-
cally advanced area― indicate that any return to the drachma would herald a 
return to that depreciation-inflation spiral with catastrophic consequences for 
large sections of  the Greek population, notably the poor, the old and the sick. 
This is why Syriza under Tsipras’ leadership, while continuing to argue the case 
for debt relief  and/or debt restructuring, have in the meantime opted to keep 
Greece in the eurozone. I, for one, certainly agree with this position.
5. Why does Germany want Greece out of the euro?
To answer this question it is necessary to rephrase it correctly. First, Germany 
as a whole does not want Greece to leave the euro. Chancellor Merkel has made 
clear, as have many other German and leaders that Greece must stay in the 
euro. This is not so much for altruistic reasons as because of  a fear that Grexit 
would trigger an unravelling of  the euro project which, after all, is only a de-
cade and a half  old. Second, the position of  Wolfgang Schauble, the German 
finance minister, is not that Greece should leave the euro but that it should 
agree to all the bailout terms and, if  it does not, only then should it consider 
leaving the euro. These two positions may look the same but they are not. The 
crux of  the matter is that while all the leading eurozone governments want 
to keep the eurozone together, they differ over the form that the eurozone 
should take. Thus while the French and Italian governments want a more flex-
ible eurozone where the weaker member economies could be supported by 
the stronger member economies either through fiscal transfers or through the 
issuance of  euro government bonds or through a combination of  both poli-
cies, the German government by contrast wants a more disciplined eurozone 
where every member country is expected to solve its own economic and finan-
cial problems without too much outside help. Shauble’s position on Grexit is 
entirely consistent with his determination that the eurozone continues to fit in 
with his neo-liberal vision.
6. What alternatives are open to small economies such as Greece, Portugal 
and Ireland to restore economic growth?
In answering this question, let me first say that exiting the euro is not a viable 
alternative for the small economies that are currently in the eurozone. Those who 
put the contrary position argue that restoration of  the national currency would 
be tantamount to restoration of  complete national sovereignty in economic 
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policy making, something that would then greatly assist the aim of  restoring 
economic growth. This argument totally ignores the current reality of  a glo-
balised and financialised world where daily foreign exchange trading amounts 
to some $6 trillion. In such a world, no small economy (or even a medium sized 
economy) can afford to allow its currency’s exchange rate to float according to 
market forces as this would risk causing extensive domestic economic damage. 
This is why 66 national currencies are currently linked to the U.S. dollar in one 
form or other, while another 27 currencies are linked to the euro, the result of  
these linkages being the substantial loss of  economic policy autonomy. Were 
Greece or Portugal or Ireland to exit the euro they would still have to peg their 
currencies to the euro (as many EU non-euro countries currently do, the UK being 
the only major exception)with the result that they would lose the benefits of  
eurozone membership while not reaping any substantial policy autonomy 
gains. The only viable alternative open to the small economies of  the euro-
zone is to continue to mount a concerted effort to change its rigid, neo-liberal 
rules and structures in favour of  ones that are far more flexible and growth-
oriented.
7. Why do you oppose Grexit?
I oppose Grexit because I reject the three major claims made in support of  it. 
The first is that a return to the drachma would be tantamount to a return to 
national economic sovereignty. As I have made clear in answer to the previ-
ous question, this is a myth. If  Greece exits the euro, it would still have to tie 
its currency to it in order to avoid the potentially catastrophic effects of  any 
exchange rate volatility. In so doing, it would lose much of  its room for policy 
manoeuvre in any case.
The second claim in favour of  Grexit is that it would enable Greece to 
increase its international competiveness thus enabling it to restore domestic 
economic growth. This claim ignores the fact that there are two dimensions to 
competiveness: a quantity (or physical) dimension as well as a price dimension. 
For Greece to be internationally competitive to the point where it can actually 
generate stable, self-reinforcing growth it has to have a material output base 
that can support such a strategy. The fact of  the matter is that this base does 
not exist. In no industrial or other manufacturing category does Greek domestic 
production exceed domestic absorption, thus making it generally import depen-
dent. Indeed, in some manufacturing categories, such as medicines, electronic 
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equipment, motor vehicles and office machinery Greece’s import dependence 
is near total. Now for Greece to turn this situation around, it would need years 
of  investment in education and training and in all of  the other business-related 
areas required for promoting Greece’s production and technological base. In 
the meantime, it would remain heavily import-dependent thus exposing it to 
serious problems were the drachma to continually depreciate in value against 
other major currencies including the euro.
The third major claim made in favour of  Grexit is that this strategy would 
help to promote international solidarity. Given that Greece’s far right Golden 
Dawn party are also in favour of  Grexit and invoke essentially the same two 
claims regarding national sovereignty and a restoration of  Greece’s economic 
competiveness in support of  their policy, the far left in Greece needs to add a 
third component to their eurosceptic position that distinguishes it from that 
of  the far right. As the latter never talk of  international solidarity but only 
emphasise national self-interest, this is the obvious distinguishing component. 
The truth of  the matter, however, is that exiting the euro and returning to the 
drachma would undermine rather than strengthen international solidarity in 
the area of  economic and financial policy. A case in point is the policy for tax-
ing the European financial sector. At the present time, it is eurozone member 
countries that are leading the fight to impose a uniform tax on this sector. This 
task is proving to be difficult even with presence of  the euro as a sheltering hub 
against the storms and pressures of  the global currency markets. Take away the 
euro and return to small national currencies, and the task of  implementing a 
uniform European wide tax on the financial sectors would be near impossible as 
the countries concerned, struggling to maintain their currencies’ exchange rates, 
would be unlikely to make such a coordinated tax policy their national priority.
8. What needs to be changed in the euro area to allow economic growth 
in small countries like Greece? 
I have already indicated above that for economic growth to take place across 
the whole eurozone, and not just in the smaller member states, the economic 
policy direction has to radically change. In particular, the austerity drive led by 
Germany and as enshrined in the ‘debt brake’ policies that it has championed 
has to be challenged far more forcefully than is currently the case. Central to 
any growth and job creating strategy must be an increase in public expenditures 
that can be financed by a number of  measures including a coordinated increase 
48        Comments and reply
in taxes on banks and multinational corporations operating in the eurozone and 
the issuance of  euro government bonds to help finance public investments in 
infrastructure and other growth generating projects.
9. Would you recommend that countries such as Turkey or the Czech 
Republic should join the euro? 
There is no uniform answer to this question. Whether countries are encouraged 
to join the euro or not should depend on a case by case basis. I do not think 
that Turkey is ready for euro membership because its economic structures and 
institutions are still not robust enough to cope with the constraints of  a single 
currency. If  Greece has found it difficult to survive in the euro, I believe that 
Turkey will find it even more so. The Czech Republic is another matter. Its 
currency is already closely tied to the euro, as are several other currencies, and 
I expect it to eventually become part of  the euro.
10. What are the alternatives open to medium sized economies under the 
current institutional arrangements? Would you recommend a mon-
etary union for these types of economies in Latin America?
First, let me repeat the point that in today’s highly financialised world where 
daily foreign exchange trading is somewhere near the $6 trillion mark, small to 
medium sized economies simply cannot afford to allow their currencies to float 
freely according to market conditions. On the contrary, they need to tie their 
currencies’ exchange rates to a major currency such as the U.S. dollar or euro, 
a policy which would inevitably entail a certain loss of  autonomy over macro-
economic policy. Ideally, small to medium sized economies that co-exist within 
a given geographical area can collectively increase their policy autonomy by 
forming a currency union that on account of  its size and depth can withstand 
the stresses of  the global forex markets. The problem is that in practice it is 
extremely difficult to form a currency union because such a strategy requires 
three sets of  criteria to be met: (i) the economies of  the common currency area 
should be highly integrated in production and trade terms: (ii) the structures 
and institutions of  the currency area countries should be broadly similar; (iii) 
the political and economic priorities of  the common currency countries should 
be broadly aligned. 
The eurozone certainly meets the first set of  criteria as intra-regional trade 
currently accounts for over 80% of  all the external trading conducted by the 
 Is fiscal policy coordination desirable for a monetary union?        49
eurozone member countries. It just as certainly does not meet the second set 
of  criteria as has always been clear and as has become even more painfully 
clear when the financial crisis ruthlessly exposed the deep-seated structural 
differences between countries like Germany on the one hand and countries 
like Greece on the other. As concerns the third set of  criteria, if  the eurozone 
currently meets these it is only in the highly problematic sense that Germany 
insists on using its economic weight to impose a dogmatic neo-liberal agenda 
on just about every other eurozone member country.
One might be tempted to say that the current problems of  the eurozone 
should serve as a warning to any other regional group of  countries intending to 
form a currency union. However, one should not overemphasise this observa-
tion as the obstacles standing in the way of  other prospective currency unions 
appear to differ from region to region. The obstacles facing the Southern Cone 
countries of  Latin America illustrate the point. This group may to a certain 
extent meet the second set of  criteria regarding broad equivalence between 
country structures and institutions. Indeed, the fact that all of  the countries 
in this group share the same language is even more of  a bonus in this regard. 
However, the external trade relations of  countries in this region appear to be 
heavily towards other geographical regions rather than towards each other, a 
fact that would then complicate attempts to reach agreement on the type of  
exchange rate and other macroeconomic policy measures that ought to be 
prioritised for the whole currency area.
Comments by Alberto Ortiz Bolañosa
Cabral and García Díaz (2015) uses a semi-structural two-country-open-econ-
omy macroeconomic model to provide insights about: 1) the desirability for 
a small open economy of  participating in a monetary union; and 2) whether 
fiscal coordination is beneficial for that small open economy participating in the 
monetary union.
The paper shows that the desirability of  participating in a monetary union is 
contingent on the inclusion of  fiscal policy considerations. On one hand, in a 
version of  the model without fiscal policy, it is shown that it is counterproductive 
a  EGADE Business School, Tecnológico de Monterrey and Center for Latin American Monetary Studies 
(Mexico), <aortizb@itesm.mx>. The views expressed in this comment are those of  the author.
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for the small open economy to participate in a monetary union (LCB
flex  0 26.  
LCB
MU  0 317. ) as the country gives up a favorable inflation-employment trade-
off  that enables monetary policy to accommodate supply shocks. On the other 
hand, in a version of  the model with fiscal policy, using the loss-function of  a 
‘benevolent’ fiscal authority as those representing the preferences of  the soci-
ety, the previous result is overturned (LFA
flex  0 331.  LFA
MU  without fiscal coordination = 
0.135) as the fiscal authority that is concerned about employment lowers taxes 
and spending in response to supply shocks, which eases inflationary pressu- 
res and promotes employment.
Given the previous results, the paper analyzes different options of  fiscal co-
ordination and concludes that a fiscal leadership strategy à la Stackelberg vis-à-vis 
the central is the most efficient coordination solution (LFA
MU  with fiscal leader = 0.128). 
This arrangement turns out to be superior to (i) a monetary union in which fiscal 
authorities conduct their policy in an independent way (LFA
MU  without fiscal coordination  
= 0.135), (ii) a monetary union in which fiscal authorities conduct their policy 
in a coordinated way (LFA
MU  with fiscal coordination  0 157. ), (iii) a regime where both 
authorities internalize the effects of  their own externalities by allowing the 
central bank to act as Stackelberg leader (LFA
MU  with monetary leader = 0.254), and (iv) a 
regime in which the small open economy decides to stay out of  the monetary 
union ( LFA
flex  0 331. ).
The study, in the spirit of  Mundell (1961) optimum currency areas, is an 
important contribution given that it calls attention to the prominent role that 
fiscal policy considerations have in the cost-benefit analysis of  monetary uni-
fication. The structure of  the analysis, where the authors show gradually how 
modifying elements of  the model ―varying country-size, comparing a flexible 
exchange rate regime versus a monetary union, adding fiscal policy, and con-
sidering different interactions of  fiscal and monetary policy― turns out useful 
to gain insights on the role that each modification has. Also, the paper derives 
analytical solutions for employment and inflation in the non-cooperative flex-
ible exchange rate regime and the monetary union, which allows it to present 
a transparent discussion of  the inflation-employment trade-offs to show that a 
smaller economy’s monetary authority faces a steeper trade-off  (can achieve 
a larger inflation reduction for a smaller employment loss that is favorable if  
the monetary authority cares relatively more about inflation than employ-
ment), while the fiscal authority faces a flatter trade-off  (can achieve a higher 
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employment gain for a small price stability loss that is advantageous if  the fiscal 
authority cares more about employment than inflation). 
The paper has interesting results, but along the way the authors make seve- 
ral decisions that compromise the generality of  the results. The most important 
decision is the welfare criteria to rank regimes as the model lacks of  a well-
defined welfare metric in terms of  individuals’ utility. The results are based on 
the comparison of  the fiscal authority’s loss function which is considered to 
be a function of  the volatility of  employment, inflation, taxation and nominal 
exchange rate, however there is no clear reason of  why these are the variables 
the society cares about, neither the relative weights that these variables should 
have in the loss function. Even conceding that this welfare criterion was valid, 
the document does not have analytical solutions to make the regimes comparison 
transparent and no sensitivity analysis is presented to show that the obtained 
rankings are not conditioned by the chosen parameters.
There are relevant aspects of  the strategic interaction of  fiscal policies within 
a monetary union absent from the analysis. For example, Hernández and Trejos 
(2013) show that sharing a currency creates a miscoordination problem akin to 
moral hazard as participating countries fiscal deficits are financed with seignior-
age from the common currency. In their environment, smaller/less productive 
countries have a bigger incentive to run larger fiscal deficits to receive a subsidy 
from the other countries in the monetary union. Other relevant aspect is related 
to the usual rules versus discretion debate over policies. For example, Dixit and 
Lambertini (2003) show that allocations are contingent on how both policies 
are conducted. Also important are the dynamic interactions among countries and 
policy institutions as the repeated nature of  the decision-making process could 
affect the optimality of  the policy choices. 
It calls the attention that the fiscal authorities’ losses are independent of  
the country size under the alternative forms of  coordination (see Table 5). As 
explained in the paper, this is consequence of  the assumption that the fiscal 
authority equalizes the tax rate in both economies. This is a useful benchmark 
to analyze coordination, but it would be interesting to understand what happens 
under coordination but tax asymmetries.
Overall, the paper sets the ground for an important debate on the desirability 
of  fiscal policy coordination for a monetary union. It provides a guideline of  
some relevant elements to be analyzed in this interaction and when possible 
52        Comments and reply
derives analytical solutions that eases understanding the ranking of  the regimes. 
There are several directions to extend the analysis and verify the robustness of  
the results, but the paper contributes by serving as a catalyzer of  this thinking. 
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Comments by Carlo Panicoa
1. A recent essay by Cabral and García Díaz proposes to assess “the appeal 
of  taking part in a large monetary union from the perspective of  small open 
economies” (Cabral and García Díaz, 2015, Abstract). According to the au-
thors, the work was motivated “by the recent experience of  Greece and other 
relatively small European Monetary Union members” (Cabral and García Díaz, 
2015, Abstract).
Their analysis makes use of  models mainly developed before the recent 
financial crisis by a literature that focuses on the evaluation of  the benefits of  
alternative exchange rate regimes. It explicitly considers the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) as “the hardest form of  pegged exchange rate regimes” (Cabral 
and García Díaz, 2015, p. 3), playing down other considerations that can have 
enhanced the regional integration of  the area. The analysis also overlooks 
the content of  two debates. The first deals with the asymmetric working of  the 
international monetary system. The second, which examines the institutional 
organization of  policy coordination in EMU and which developed after the euro 
a  Professor at the Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II (Italy) and visiting professor School of  
Economics at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM, Mexico), <panico@unina.it>.
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area began to operate in 1999, reaches conclusions that are relevant for the is-
sues considered by Cabral and García Díaz.
This comment discusses the consequence of  disregarding these debates. 
It argues that “the appeal of  taking part in a large monetary union from the 
perspective of  small open economies” cannot be evaluated without taking into 
account their results. Cabral and García Díaz conclude that the participation 
in a monetary union is counterproductive for a small economy unless the fiscal 
authorities act as a Stackelberg leader in the coordination between monetary 
and fiscal policy. This conclusion makes it difficult to understand why:
v  small economies in Europe strive to join the euro area in spite of  the fact that 
fiscal policy is rigidly constrained and the monetary authorities act as a Stackel-
berg leader;
v  the Greek government, after an important political victory in the referendum 
held on the 5th of  July 2015, accepted the heavy conditions imposed by the Euro-
pean authorities in the negotiation leading to the renewal of  financial assistance.
The analysis of  Cabral and García Díaz leads to conclude that these choices 
are wrong and irrational. A different conclusion is instead achieved if, by tak-
ing into account the changes occurred in the financial system since the 1980s, 
one considers the existence of  a liberalised and highly unstable international 
monetary system, which favours the rich economies at the expenses of  the oth-
ers, and of  the different implications for growth and stability of  the alternative 
approaches to the institutional organization of  policy coordination.
The comment develops as follows. Section 2 considers how the debate on 
the asymmetric working of  the international monetary system enters in the 
choices of  the euro countries. Section 3 examines the debate on the institutional 
organization of  policy coordination in EMU and the implications for growth and 
stability of  the alternative approaches to this problem. Section 4 concludes.
2. The economies using the euro enjoy a privileged position in an interna-
tional monetary system. They can count on a currency allowing them to avoid 
increasing the ratio official reserve-Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and other 
problems that are due to the asymmetric working of  the international monetary 
system. The integration and the size of  the international financial markets 
strengthen the role of  the hierarchy existing among the currencies (see Patnaik, 
2002; MacKinnon, 2002; Aguiar de Medeiros, 2008; Prasad, 2014; Chapoy 
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Bonifaz, 2014). Some of  them, considered by the operators of  better quality (or 
of  class-A), are preferred to others, considered of  class-B, whenever uncertainty 
increases. According to MacKinnon (2002), “peripheral monies” are held only 
provisionally because the preference for the “definitive monies” of  the richest 
countries is powerful. As a consequence, large flows of  capital move towards 
the latter countries as soon as uncertainty rises.
The asymmetric working of  the international monetary system can clarify 
why the dollar revaluated in 2008 while Lehman Brothers was breaking down 
and the U.S. financial system was risking a general collapse and why emerging and 
developing countries, independently of  the deficits or surpluses prevailing in the 
current accounts of  their balance of  payments, have been obliged to accumulate 
increasing amounts of  official reserves during the last decades (see Mohanty 
and Turner, 2005 and 2006; International Relations Committee Task Force, 
2006; Frenkel, 2015). This tendency, instead of  generating net flows of  capital 
moving from more to less rich countries, as promised before the liberalisations 
began, has forced the latter to finance the former through the investment of  
official reserves in high quality assets (see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004).
Figure 1
Ratio oﬃcial reserves-єёѝ, selected countries, 1960-2012
(Percentages, averages)
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Figure 1 shows the data regarding the ratio official reserves-GDP of  Central and 
Latin America countries, confirming that in these countries the ratio has been 
progressively increasing.
Figure 2 further corroborates the existence of  an asymmetric working of  
the international monetary system by showing that some rich countries [United 
States of  America (USA), United Kingdom (UK) and Canada] have reduced the 
ratio official reserves-GDP before the crisis.1
Figure 2
Ratio oﬃcial reserves-єёѝ, selected countries, 1960-2012
(Percentages, annual data, average values of the three countries)
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Source: Our elaboration of World Bank and іњѓ data [Download 31 December 2014].
The accumulation of  official reserves for emerging and developing countries 
raises several problems. It affects the issue of  monetary base and makes sterilis-
1  Canada moved from 5.1% of  the 1960s and 1970s to 3.7% of  the 1980s, to 3.3% of  the 1990s and to 
3.8% of  the first decade of  the new millennium. During the same five decades UK moved from 3.3 
to 5.0, to 4.9, to 3.8 and to 2.3%. Finally, USA moved from 2.5% of  the 1960s, to 2.7% of  the 1970s, to 
3.6% of  the 1980s, to 2.2% of  the 1990s and to 1.7% of  the first decade of  the new millennium.
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ing interventions by the central banks necessary. Without these interventions, 
the banking systems would own such a large amount of  monetary base as to 
make the operation of  monetary policy impossible. Yet, sterilising interven-
tions can affect the efficient operation of  financial institutions (see Mohanty 
and Turner, 2005; 2006), of  the financial system and of  the management of  
the public debt.2
The asymmetric working of  the international monetary system generates 
other differences in the behaviour of  the economies. Emerging and developing 
countries do not implement the standard scheme of  the Inflation Targeting 
policy. They fear that sudden speculative attacks can transform small move-
ments in the nominal exchange rate into dangerous devaluations.3 According 
to Céspedes, Chang, and Velasco (2013, p. 1), in Latin America the stability of  
the nominal exchange rate has been an objective of  the monetary policy even 
if  the central banks have not declared that (see also Canales-Kriljenko, 2003; 
Hüfner, 2004; BIS, 2005 and the Symposium on “Monetary Policy and Central 
Banking in Latin America” published in Comparative Economic System in 
2015). For these authors, the interest rate that the central banks set in their 
policy, not only reacts in different degrees to the inflation and the output gaps, 
as foreseen by the standard model of  Inflation Targeting (see Svensson, 1999 
and 2010; Svensson et al., 2005; Woodford, 2003), but it is also influenced by 
the attempts of  the authorities to signal their decision to consider the exchange 
rate as a “nominal anchor”.
The stability of  the nominal exchange rate contributes to the control of  
inflation. Yet, if  the inflation rate in the less rich countries is higher than that 
of  the richest ones, a stable nominal exchange rate generates a revaluation of  
the real exchange rate, which in turn affects the international competitive-
ness of  the economy. What’s more, the structure of  the interest rates of  the 
emerging and developing countries tends to show a positive difference with 
2  In Mexico, in order to avoid reducing their profits, the central bank, without asking permission to the 
Treasury, issues government bonds that are purchased by the Mexican banks. The receipts of  these 
issues are deposited in irredeemable accounts. The government sector owns these accounts, but can-
not use them, in spite of  the fact that it pays the corresponding interests (see Panico, 2014). For other 
problems generated by the accumulation of  financial reserves, see Reinhart and Reinhart (1999) and 
Griffith-Jones, Montes, and Nasution (2001).
3  See Frenkel (2015) and Ros (2015). The latter points out that, in the case of  the Mexican economy, 
what Calvo and Reinhart (2002) call fear to float is, as a matter of  fact, a fear to devalue.
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that of  the richest countries because the central banks of  the former tend to 
choose higher policy rates than those prevailing in the latter in order to avoid 
the occurrence of  net outflows of  capital and related devaluations. Both condi-
tions, which have been prevailing in recent decades, affect the growth of  GDP 
and prevent the economy from fully exploiting its growth potentials.
Figure 3
Ratio oﬃcial reserves-єёѝ, selected countries, 1960-2012
(Percentages, annual data)
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Source: Our elaboration of World Bank and іњѓ data [Download 31 December 2014]. 
The adoption of  the euro has allowed the EMU member States to avoid these 
problems. Figure 3 presents the data regarding the ratio official reserves-GDP 
of  the twelve countries4 participating in the monetary union in 2002, of  the 
nineteen countries that are now participating in it5 and of  the Eastern European 
countries waiting to be admitted.6 Those using the euro show a notable ability to 
4  The twelve countries are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Holland, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxemburg, Portugal and Spain.
5  The seven countries that have entered EMU after 2002 are: Slovenia in 2007, Cyprus and Malta in 
2008, Slovakia in 2009, Estonia in 2011, Latonia in 2014 and Latvia in 2015.
6  The countries of  the European Union waiting to use the euro are: Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungry, Poland, 
Czech Republic and Rumania.
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reduce the ratio official reserves-GDP.7 The countries that entered the EMU after 
2002 reduced the ratio only after starting to participate. The Eastern European 
countries waiting to be admitted have instead been bound to increase the ratio, 
which has approached 30% of  GDP during the recent financial crisis.
The data presented in Figure 3 suggest a reason for desiring to be part of  
the monetary union even in the presence of  a policy coordination process in 
which the monetary authorities act as a Stackelberg leader. By entering the euro 
area, the Eastern European countries can benefit from the opportunity to invest 
in domestic activities, rather than in other countries’ financial assets, the large 
amount of  official reserves that now they have to accumulate.
As to Greece’s acceptance of  the conditions imposed by the European au-
thorities after the striking result of  the referendum of  the 5th of  July, the previ-
ous data suggest that leaving the monetary union would have imposed on this 
country a heavy toll in terms of  official reserves to be accumulated. This toll 
would have required a further squeeze on the income distributed to the citizens, 
unless the country could receive a large foreign loan for the accumulation of  
official reserves. The absence of  this second solution must have influenced the 
choices of  the Greek national authorities.
3. Some data regarding the interest rates show that, before the debt crisis of  
2010, the participation in EMU brought about other benefits to the member 
countries. Figure 4 compares the interest rates on 10-year government bonds of  
Germany and other euro countries. It shows that the difference between these 
rates was large before the introduction of  the euro, almost disappeared until the 
start of  the debt crisis in 2010, “burst” with the debt crisis from Spring 2010 to 
Summer 2012, and returned to more tolerable values when some mechanisms 
of  the coordination process were changed by the ECB’s decision to introduce the 
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs), a programme allowing the Eurosystem 
to discretionarily purchase sovereign bonds in the secondary markets.
The analysis of  the causes of  the debt crisis has underlined the role of  the 
faults in the institutional organization of  the coordination process between 
7  This tendency can be also noticed for the data of  the individual countries. Germany for instance, has 
moved from 9.6% of  the 1970s and 1980s to 5.2% of  the 1990s and to 4.1% of  the new millennium. 
Greece shows values around 5.5% until the 1980s, a sharp increase (10.3%) in the 1990s, before be-
ing admitted into the euro area and a pronounced fall (3.3%) during the participation in EMU. Spain 
moved from 4.4% in the 1960s to 9.5% in the 1990s to 3.1% in the new millennium.
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monetary and fiscal policies. Without pretending to cover the different aspects 
of  this debate, this comment points out that the existence of  these faults had 
already been acknowledged, before the international financial crisis of  2007-
2008, by a debate, which dealt with points overlooked by Cabral and García 
Díaz and which proposed reforms to be introduced in order to avoid low 
growth and instability (for an analysis of  this debate, see Panico and Vázquez 
Suárez, 2008). The international financial crisis turned the attention of  the au-
thorities away from these proposals. They were however necessary and the 
incapacity of  the European authorities to introduce them, together with the 
changes in the relations among the different participants in the Union that 
the international financial crisis brought about, can be seen as a major cause 
of  the disruption of  the sovereign debt markets (see Panico and Purificato, 
2013; Capraro et al., 2013).
Figure 4
Secondary market yields of some European government 
bonds with maturities of close to 10 years, selected countries (1994-2014)
(Percentages, monthly data)
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The debate on the EMU institutional organization developed before the inter-
national financial crisis and reached a wide consensus on the inefficient policy 
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outcomes of  the existing organization and on need to change it. There was agree-
ment on the fact that it generated policies that are pro-cyclical and unable to 
take into account the specific needs of  the different economies. There was, on 
the other side, disagreement on how to reform the coordination process. This 
disagreement reflected the different views on the working of  the economic 
system held by the participants in the debate (see Panico and Vázquez Suárez, 
2008; Panico and Purificato, 2013).
According to some authors (see Canzoneri and Diba, 1999; Alesina et al., 
2001; Buti, Eijffinger, and Franco, 2003; Calmfors and Corsetti, 2003; Blanchard 
and Giavazzi, 2004; Beestma and Debrun, 2005; Buti, Eijffinger, and Franco, 
2005; Calmfors, 2005), policy coordination must be seen as amounting to im-
posing fiscal discipline on the national governments deciding fiscal policies and 
delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank. Using the words 
of  Cabral and García Díaz one can say that these authors sponsored a coor-
dination process in which the monetary authorities act as a Stackelberg leader. 
Other authors (see Wyplosz, 1999 and 2005; Pisani-Ferri, 2002; von Hagen and 
Mundschenk, 2003; Fatás and Mihov, 2003, Fatás et al., 2003; von Hagen, 2004) 
adopted a different view, retaining that the identification of  common actions by 
the monetary and fiscal authorities cannot be played down because the choice 
of  the policy mix is relevant for the behaviour of  the economy.
According to the former authors, the main problem of  the coordination 
process is to achieve effectiveness in imposing discipline on the national fiscal 
authorities in order to minimise their free riding behaviour. Rather than chang-
ing the institutional organization of  the coordination process, the reforms 
they proposed before the international financial crisis regarded the rules of  
the Stability and Growth Pact and of  the Excessive Deficit Procedures. These 
rules had to adequately punish misaligned behaviours in order to achieve ef-
fectiveness in minimising free riding.
According to the latter authors, to improve the policy outcomes of  the coor-
dination process it was necessary to reform both the institutional organization 
of  EMU and the rules of  the Stability and Growth Pact and of  the Excessive 
Deficit Procedures. Von Hagen and Mundschenk (2003) present an analysis of  
the strategic interaction among the actors of  the coordination process to show 
that the institutional organization set up at the start of  the monetary union 
favours the development of  non-cooperative attitudes among the monetary and 
fiscal authorities and consequently leads to inefficient policy outcomes. Under 
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these conditions, monetary and fiscal policies end up by working as strategic 
substitutes, rather than as complements: ‘If  the governments pursue output 
targets exceeding the level of  aggregate demand the central bank wishes to 
achieve, they will boost public deficits. Anticipating this, the central bank will 
tighten monetary policy more than it would otherwise. The result is an inef-
ficient combination of  tight monetary and loose fiscal conditions. Cooperative 
policies could achieve a better policy mix with lower interest rates and smaller 
deficits’ (von Hagen and Mundschenk, 2003, p. 284).
Von Hagen and Mundschenk recall that the coordination process existing 
in EMU adopts a “narrow approach”, which focuses on monitoring the national 
fiscal policies in order to penalise those who take decisions that, according to the 
coordinating authorities, negatively affect the euro area. Within this approach, 
“punishment”, i.e. the penalties foreseen by the norms of  the Excess Deficit 
Procedures, plays a central role in the coordination process.
According to von Hagen and Mundschenk, the “narrow approach” gener-
ates non-cooperative attitudes among the authorities and must be replaced by 
a “broad approach”, which is based on the use of  methods, instruments and 
incentives favouring the participation of  all authorities in the identification 
and the implementation of  common policy objectives. This proposal underlines 
the need to create a positive environment through the active participation of  all 
actors in the decision process and the need to introduce a system of  incentives 
based on both penalties and prizes. As in any aspect of  human life, a system of  
incentives only based on “punishment”, instead of  generating responsible and 
law-abiding participation, stimulates dishonest and deceiving attitudes.
Some outstanding economists of  the past underlined the relevance of  
cooperative attitudes in the management of  economic policy. Entering into 
a debate between the U.S. monetary and fiscal authorities, Samuelson made a 
strong statement on this point:
I do not wish to go into the merits of  the struggle between the Treasury and 
Federal Reserve. Let me simply state dogmatically that the Secretary of  the 
Treasury should be just as concerned for the nation’s stability as the Central 
Banker. (…) [T]here is no legitimate clash between Treasury and Central Bank 
policy: They must be unified or coordinated on the basis of  the over-all stabili-
sation needs of  the economy, and it is unthinkable that these two great agencies 
could ever be divorced in functions or permitted to work at cross purposes. 
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(In particular it is nonsense to believe, as many proponents of  monetary policy 
used to argue, that fiscal policy has for its goal the stabilisation of  employment 
and reduction of  unemployment, while monetary policy has for its goal the 
stabilisation of  prices. In comparison with fiscal policy, monetary policy has no 
differential effectiveness on prices rather than on output) (…). I have already 
asserted that the Treasury and Central Bank have to be co-ordinated in the 
interests of  national stability, so I am little interested in the division of  labour 
between them’ (Samuelson, 1956, pp. 14-15).
An example of  efficient coordination within EMU can be found in the organiza-
tion of  monetary policy. The Eurosystem too requires a coordination process 
that guarantees that the super-national decisions, taken in Frankfurt, are correctly 
executed at the national level. In this case, the coordination process follows a 
“broad approach”. The National Central Banks (NCBs) directly participate in 
the decision process by discretionarily making technical evaluations in order 
to identify common interests, objectives and actions. Unlike what happens in 
fiscal policy, monetary policy decisions are not based on rigid rules. Moreover, 
the system of  incentives introduced to coordinate the implementation of  
monetary policy at the national level is mainly based on prizing the institutional 
loyalty and the professional merit. To guarantee the correct implementation 
of  the super-national decisions, the European Treaties and the Statute of  the 
European System of  Central Banks and of  the European Central Bank also 
foresee penalties for incorrect behaviours.8 These rules, which can oblige the 
NCBs’ directors to implement the decisions taken at the super-national level, 
are conceived to affect the powers of  these executives while avoiding penalis-
ing the citizens. It is worth noticing that, owing to the efficient working of  the 
system of  incentives based on prizes, these penalties have never been used.
The analysis of  von Hagen and Mundschenk supports the standpoint held 
by the authors who proposed a reform both of  the institutional organization 
8  According to Articles 258 and 271(d) of  the Consolidated Version of  the Treaty of  the Union and 
of  the Treaty on the functioning of  the European Union (2008/C115/01) and to Articles 14.3 
and 35.6 of  the Statute of  the European System of  Central Banks and of  the European Central 
Bank (Protocol n. 4 of  the Consolidated Version, 2008/C115/01), in a case of  conflict between a 
NCB and the ECB on the execution of  the NCB’s obligations, the ECB, after having exposed its reasons 
in a written document and after giving the NCB the opportunity to clarify its reasons, can ask the latter 
to conform its behaviour to the ECB’s instruction within an established time. If  the NCB still fails to 
follow the instructions, the ECB can ask the European Court of  Justice to intervene and impose on 
the NCB the respect of  its obligations.
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of  the EMU coordination process and of  the rules of  the Stability and Growth 
Pact and of  the Excessive Deficit Procedures. As to the institutional organiza-
tion, they recommend the introduction of  independent fiscal agencies.
According to Wyplosz (2005), the institutional organization of  fiscal policy 
has to follow the positive experience of  monetary policy, which achieved sat-
isfactory results when, after acknowledging the failure of  rigid rules, such as 
Friedman’s for the growth of  monetary aggregates, it moved to institutional 
reforms and central bank independence. Wyplosz proposed to set up inde-
pendent ‘fiscal policy committees’ similar to ‘monetary policy committees’, 
arguing that they can generate better results than rigid numerical rules.9 The 
committees can fix, year after year, the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio that each 
country must respect, taking into account the cyclical conditions and the struc-
tural needs of  the economies and having as an objective the sustainability of  
government debt. A similar proposal can be made for the application of  other 
related policies, concerned with infrastructures, energy, environment, industrial 
development, etc. As to the rules regarding the incentives for the monetary 
and fiscal authorities, they should be based on both prizes and penalties and 
should be directed to create a cooperative environment among the authorities. 
These conditions should lead to the restoration of  the efficient use of  fiscal, 
industrial and other policies and to the identification of  an appropriate policy 
mix for the euro area.
Without pretending to enter into the details of  these complex problems, let’s 
suggest here that a European policy focusing on infrastructures or industrial 
development can provide some prizes for the system of  incentives. The policy 
should be operated by lending the resources collected through euro-bonds 
issued by the European Commission to an independent Agency and should 
be designed at the super-national level with the direct participation of  all the 
authorities. The design of  the policy should take into account the loyalty of  
the national authorities to the European values and decisions. It can prize the 
loyal authorities and be used to penalise those who do not respect the super-
national decisions, having care to avoid damaging the citizens of  that country. 
In the case of  violation of  the European agreements, for instance, the Agency 
should have the power to transfer the execution of  the projects from the na-
9  Pisani-Ferry (2002), Fatás and Mihov (2003; 2010) and Fatás et al. (2003), von Hagen (2004) hold the 
same position.
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tional to a super-national authority, thus hitting the interests of  the national 
politicians involved without affecting those of  the citizens.
Going back to the essay of  Cabral and García Díaz, one can notice the 
relevance that the debate on the institutional organization of  EMU attributed 
to participation and cooperative attitudes. In the essay of  Cabral and García 
Díaz hardly any attention is devoted to these elements. Indeed, their problem 
is to identify through maximising procedures which authority should lead the 
process and which should be obliged to follow.
Unlike what happened in the past (as the previous reference to Samuelson’s 
position points out), this way of  designing the relations among State institu-
tions (or among the institutions participating in the governance of  an economy, 
as in the case of  EMU) is widespread in recent economy literature, particularly 
after the seminal contribution of  Rogoff  (1985), which originated the so-called 
“institutional design literature”. Several outstanding criticisms have been raised 
against this literature (for a review of  the criticisms to its application to mon-
etary policy, see Panico and Rizza, 2004). As the essay by Cabral and García 
Díaz indicates, this literature can provide useful insights. Yet, it has to recognise 
the limitations that it faces in the study of  the relations among institutions. As 
Tobin (1994) pointed out, its overlooking of  the complex working of  gover-
nance can generate some serious problems when it is concretely applied to 
the institutional organization of  an economy. Tobin, in particular, expressed 
some preoccupations for the safeguarding of  democracy, which is founded on 
the respect of  procedures and not on the mere achievement of  results defined 
by economic theory as socially optimal.
His preoccupations remind us that the use of  the notion of  economic 
rationality in the analysis of  individual choices brings about both accomplish-
ments and disappointments. Attention to the notion of  “bounded rationality” 
makes us discover that other elements, such as fears, habits, conventions, etc., 
are relevant when individual choices are taken. The same applies to the study 
of  institutions, in which elements like confidence, cooperation, democratic 
legitimation and participation, can hardly be disregarded.
4. The essay of  Cabral and García Díaz provides a valuable analysis of  how to 
organize a pegged exchange rate regime. Its complex analysis provides in-
teresting insights into this issue. Yet, it disregards elements that are crucial for 
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interpreting the working of  a process of  regional integration and monetary 
unification, like EMU. These elements are related to the need to defend the econo-
mies and the citizens from the growing instability generated by the working of  
a large, powerful and internationally integrated financial system and to create 
a coordination process in which cooperation among the actors and loyalty to 
shared values play a central role.
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Comentarios de Leonardo Egidio Torre Cepedaa
En el trabajo los autores se plantean dos preguntas. La primera es si participar 
en una unión monetaria es deseable para una pequeña economía abierta. La 
segunda es si, dentro de una unión monetaria, la coordinación fiscal beneficia o 
perjudica a una pequeña economía abierta que delega su política monetaria a 
una autoridad central. Para ello, construyen un modelo basado en Canzoneri 
y Henderson (1991); Ghironi y Giavazzi (1998); Eichengreen y Ghironi (2002); 
Jensen (1991); Pizzati (2001), y Eichengreen y Ghironi (2002).
Apoyados en su modelo base, los autores demuestran que, dejando consi-
deraciones fiscales a un lado, a una pequeña economía abierta no le conviene 
participar en una unión monetaria debido a que puede beneficiarse de la esta-
bilidad que ofrece la unión, al tiempo que conserva la capacidad de utilizar su 
política monetaria para cuando enfrente choques. 
Sin embargo, cuando se toman en cuenta aspectos fiscales, participar en una 
unión monetaria se vuelve económicamente rentable, ya que ante un choque 
(negativo) en productividad, la autoridad fiscal, al preocuparse por los niveles 
de empleo dentro de la unión monetaria, reaccionará reduciendo impuestos y 
gasto público a fin de atenuar presiones inflacionarias y de desempleo. A lo an-
terior se le deben agregar las ganancias derivadas por la ausencia de volatilidad 
cambiaria y la reducción en impuestos. 
De acuerdo con el modelo base, dentro de una unión monetaria la estrategia 
en la cual la autoridad fiscal actúa como un líder (a la Stackelberg) en la toma de 
decisiones, y la autoridad monetaria es la seguidora, no sólo es la estrategia más 
eficiente, sino también la más probable que emerja. La defensa que hacen los 
autores de su principal conclusión encuentra sustento en el hecho de que las 
autoridades fiscales son, por naturaleza de los marcos institucionales en los que 
operan, las líderes, dado que fijan sus posturas con antelación y con menor 
frecuencia que las autoridades monetarias. 
Si bien el modelo base está bien especificado y las derivaciones son correctas, 
existen algunas áreas de oportunidad para refinar el trabajo.
Un primer punto se refiere al concepto de free riding que utilizan los autores 
en la introducción, ya que éste es esencial para entender por qué si se dejan los 
a  Dirección General de Investigación Económica del Banco de México y Universidad Autónoma de 
Nuevo León (México), <leonardo.torre@banxico.org.mx>.
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aspectos fiscales a un lado, una unión monetaria no resulta rentable para una 
pequeña economía abierta.
Un segundo punto es por qué al inicio de la tercera sección los autores 
plantean que el “problema de los bancos centrales es alcanzar la estabilidad 
de precios”, siendo que al suponer que S1 es igual a 0.2, implícitamente están 
suponiendo que los bancos centrales están tomando en consideración tanto la 
inflación como el empleo en su función objetivo.
Otro punto que convendría que los autores describieran de manera general, 
quizá en una nota al pie, es lo que ocurre con los resultados en el cuadro 2 a 
medida que B pasa de 0.5 a 0.9. ¿Es el incremento en los costos lineal?
Un supuesto muy fuerte del modelo, a primera instancia, es proponer una 
autoridad fiscal benevolente ocupada en maximizar el bienestar de sus residentes 
(ocupándose simultáneamente de sus niveles de inflación, empleo, cargas fisca-
les y volatilidad cambiaria). En este sentido, los autores deberían mencionar si 
sus principales resultados se mantienen aún en el caso de autoridades fiscales 
“egoístas”. Si no existe literatura al respecto, mencionar en sus comentarios 
finales que ésta puede ser una futura línea de investigación.
Los autores también podrían “balancear” un poco más su introducción y sus 
conclusiones, pues mientras en la primera enfatizan que “la diferencia entre las 
dimensiones de los miembros de la Unión Monetaria Europea es un aspecto 
importante que pudiera tener efectos profundos en los procesos de estabilización 
de estas economías”, en las conclusiones se olvidan de este punto. 
Resulta interesante destacar que el modelo básico que aquí se presenta (sin 
consideraciones fiscales) y que indica que ante un choque real resulta conve-
niente contar con un tipo de cambio flexible y no con un tipo de cambio fijo 
(como implica pertenecer a una Unión Monetaria), es similar al resultado que 
se desprende del modelo clásico IS-LM-BP para una pequeña economía abierta 
con tipo de cambio flexible y en el cual, ante choques reales exógenos, la política 
monetaria resulta una herramienta efectiva para estabilizar producción y empleo. 
Este hecho podría mencionarse, si los autores así lo consideran pertinente, en 
alguna nota al pie.
Reply to the comments by Ortiz, Panico and Torre
The thoughtful comments by Ortiz, Panico and Torre provide us with the 
opportunity to reflect on some aspects that we might have omitted or not dis-
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cussed in enough detail in our paper. We welcome this opportunity to reply 
and provide more specifics on some of  those comments, as well as to express 
our own thoughts and opinions about their remarks. We focus our attention on 
three of  those comments.
The first important remark made by the commentators has to do with the 
absence of  other important fiscal policy considerations not discussed in our 
paper, such as the incentives of  fiscal authorities to run large deficits and issue 
debt under different policy regimes. No doubt, these are important aspects that 
led to significant economic instability following the recent global financial crisis. 
Clearly, in our analysis we had to disregard important variables like seigniorage 
and public debt from our government budget constraint given the limited ability 
of  our model to handle intertemporal decision-making. Unfortunately, the static 
nature of  our model does not provide enough grounds to explore potentially 
important moral hazard dilemmas that emerge from fiscal policy interaction 
under alternative monetary and fiscal coordination schemes. We think this is 
eminently an area of  work for further research which would be more success-
fully addressed under a different model specification.
A second related issue expressed by the commentators is about the lack of  
analytical solutions to allow the comparison of  regimes in a more transparent 
fashion. While we strived to reach those comparisons, the presence of  asym-
metric features prevent us from finding suitable analytical expressions to carry 
out detailed regime rankings. We realize that this is in fact the same problem 
faced by other authors who have introduced asymmetric features in the size 
and structure of  the economies under this framework (see, for instance, the 
references cited in the paper by Ghironi and Giavazzi (1998) and Eichengreen 
and Ghironi (2002)).  Apparently, the only way to reach comparable analytical 
solutions is when B =1/2. However, this is the less interesting case in which 
the two economies in our model are size symmetric. Due to the impossibility 
of  deriving analytical solutions we had to rely on a numerical solution based on 
parameters borrowed from empirical evidence or used previously in related 
literature.
Finally, with respect to the scope of  our paper, the work we present is theo-
retical in nature and does not consider other political implications concerning 
the feasibility of  the alternative fiscal and monetary policy regimes explored. 
We think that the Photis Lysandrou interview, published in this same issue of  
Investigación Económica, as well as the comments by Panico, and the references 
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therein, offer a very good overview of  those potential political implications that 
escape from the analysis here presented. Indeed, we have left aside elements 
that might be crucial for achieving the political integration of  a currency union, 
such as the grounding institutional framework and the incentives of  individual 
countries, but they are outside the scope of  this paper. We leave this important 
theme as a line for further research.
